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THE LOST HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING 
Michael A. Perino* 
Common conceptions about the history of insider trading norms in the 
United States are inaccurate and incomplete. In his landmark 1966 book 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Dean Henry Manne depicted a world 
in which insider trading was both widespread and universally accepted. It 
was SEC enforcement efforts in the early 1960s, he contended, that swayed 
public opinion to condemn what had previously been considered a natural 
and unobjectionable market feature. For five decades, the legal academy 
has largely accepted Manne’s historical description, and the vigorous de-
bates over whether the federal government should prosecute insider trading 
have assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, the accuracy of those views. 
This paper challenges that conventional wisdom and shows that the shift in 
insider trading norms began earlier than has previously been supposed and 
substantially preceded governmental enforcement efforts. Insider trading, 
while generally believed to be ubiquitous in turn-of-the-century stock mar-
kets, was not universally condoned. In fact, the propriety of the practice at 
publicly traded companies was highly contested. Those debates coincided 
with the growth of public companies and an ongoing shift in views about 
how the stock market functioned. The early twentieth century debate over 
insider trading thus featured both modern arguments about property rights 
in information and the effect that insider trading has on stock market par-
ticipation and older ideas about manipulation and market inefficiency that 
would generally not be accepted today. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1960s, insider trading enforcement has been central to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) mandate to police the securities 
marketplace.1 The counter-revolution against that effort began almost immedi-
ately when, in 1966, Henry Manne published Insider Trading and the Stock Mar-
ket.2 In that book, Manne charged that the SEC was embarked on a quixotic mis-
sion that would actually harm the operation of the capital markets, and he called 
for a return to the pre-1900 common law approach—directors and officers should 
be allowed to trade freely on material nonpublic information so long as they re-
frained from making affirmative misrepresentations to shareholders.3 
Over the next five decades, scholars, largely following Manne’s conse-
quentialist approach, have argued that requiring parity of information between 
market participants is unworkable and reduces valuable incentives to acquire in-
formation.4 Insider trading increases market efficiency by allowing stock prices 
to move more quickly to their correct levels when companies cannot disclose 
information to the marketplace.5 More controversially, permitting insiders to 
trade on nonpublic information provides a form of compensation that encourages 
them to maximize firm value.6 Punishing insider trading, by contrast, is not about 
protecting innocent shareholders; indeed, insider trading arguably imposes no 
harm on contemporaneous traders.7 The explanation for the ban lies instead in 
public choice theory because prohibiting corporate officials from trading confers 
 
 1.  See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969); In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961); Andrew Ceresney, Testimony on Oversight of the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/tes-
timony/031915-test.html (“Policing insider trading has long been central to the Commission’s mission of ensur-
ing confidence in the markets.”). 
 2.  Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRY G. 
MANNE (Fred S. McChesney, ed. 2009). 
 3. Id. at 9. 
 4.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
253–54 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. 
STUD. 1, 30 (1978). Contemporary insider trading doctrine rejects the equal access theory. See Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980). 
 5.  See Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 88–102; see also Dennis W. Carlton 
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983). 
 6.  See Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 121–56; Carlton & Fischel, supra 
note 5, at 870–71. 
 7.  Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 32–36 (1980). But 
see William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is 
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1243 (1981). 
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an advantage on insiders’ main trading rivals, securities market professionals.8 
Most of these accounts posit that insider trading is primarily about property rights 
in information9 and should therefore be a matter of contract individually negoti-
ated between firms and those privy to material nonpublic information,10 although 
at least some commentators recognize that difficulties in drafting and enforcing 
such contracts might justify public enforcement.11 
Those who offer more generous support for governmental enforcement ef-
forts tend to adopt the same consequentialist framework but argue instead that 
insider trading is largely about perceptions and the impact those perceptions have 
on the proper functioning of the stock market.12 To be sure, they dispute the ef-
ficiency and compensation claims made for insider trading. Insider and deriva-
tively informed trading, they argue, is unlikely to yield substantial efficiency 
gains.13 It provides a poorly targeted compensation scheme14 that, among other 
problems, allows insiders to take advantage of bad information just as easily as 
good.15 Insider trading also arguably creates substantial agency cost problems 
that might lead managers to delay disclosure or increase stock price volatility in 
order to create more profitable trading opportunities.16 The main argument in 
favor of robust insider trading enforcement, however, remains that such enforce-
ment is crucial to protecting the perceived fairness and integrity of the securities 
markets.17 Without vigorous enforcement, the cost of capital will rise and, at the 
 
 8.  See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with 
an Application to Insider Trading, 30 J. L. & ECON. 311, 314–17 (1987). 
 9.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trad-
ing Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1995). 
 10.  See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 870–72; Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Prin-
ciples of Insider Trading after United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1489 (2016). 
 11.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 263. 
 12.  Both sides of the insider trading debate agree that current legal doctrines are poorly theorized and 
riddled with inconsistencies. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to 
the ‘Chicago School,’ 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 634 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Pro-
posal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 184 (1991); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional 
Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1999). 
 13.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 631 (1984) (explaining that insider trading is only likely to move the price of the security slowly and spo-
radically and therefore permitting it “is unlikely to have much effect on the efficiency of securities prices”). 
 14.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production 
of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 317; Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a 
Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4–6 (2010). 
 15.  See Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 
117, 126 (1982). 
 16.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 599–601 (2002); EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 260; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, Insider Trading and the Managerial 
Choice Among Risky Projects, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 1 (1994) (arguing that the ability to trade 
on inside information may lead managers to choose riskier projects); Levmore, supra note 15, at 149 (speculating 
that insiders “might structure corporate transactions in a way that increases the number of occasions for secret-
keeping”). 
 17.  See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture 
their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”); 
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 322, 356 (1979) (arguing that “investors will refrain from dealing altogether” in a market beset with 
insider trading); Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of Conservative Economics, 
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extreme, investors will flee the equity markets, harming capital formation and 
the economy as a whole. 
A second, less common line of argument focuses on whether it is “right” to 
permit insider trading.18 Insider trading laws, in these deontological accounts, are 
not predominantly about efficiency; they are about protecting “the autonomy of 
public securities traders” and “structurally disadvantaged parties” from unfair 
and wrongful deception.19 Donald Langevoort argues for the symbolic im-
portance of the insider trading ban, which he contends demonstrates a deep soci-
etal commitment to equality of opportunity and a desire for strict adherence to 
fiduciary obligations.20 Others link morality and agency costs, arguing that in-
sider trading laws target improper, self-regarding gain and thus reflect general-
ized anticorruption norms.21 
While vigorous, these debates over the costs and benefits of insider trading 
enforcement have been almost entirely ahistorical. There have certainly been 
analyses of the common law approach to insider trading,22 but there has been no 
serious attempt to explore other, earlier conceptions about the legitimacy of in-
sider trading, the function it was thought to perform, or the harm it might engen-
der. Some modern commentators argue that there is little empirical support for 
claims about the harms associated with insider trading or complain that pervasive 
 
4 CATO J. 945, 953–55 (1985); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and 
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440–42 (1967). The same rationale underlies Regulation FD, which 
prohibits certain market participants from making selective disclosures of material nonpublic information to se-
curities market professionals. Regulation Fair Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 
243, 249 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
 18.  See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When is it Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-
Public Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORD. URB. L. J. 445, 484 (2011); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 123 
(1993); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 376 
(1999). Law and economics scholars dismiss these deontological theories as irrelevant to the normative question 
of whether law should ban insider trading. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 262 (arguing that “the 
consequences of trading for investors’ wealth” are “unrelated to fairness and beliefs about managers’ preferred 
position”); Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 25 (“[N]o amount of moral exhortation 
can substitute for the rigorous analysis necessary to understand the problem of insider trading.”); Carlton & 
Fischel, supra note 5, at 882 (“If insider trading is efficient, no independent notions of fairness suggest that it 
should be prohibited.”); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 549 
(1970) [hereinafter Manne, Law Professors] (arguing that moral arguments were “frequently either sham or a 
refuge for the intellectually bankrupt”). 
 19.  Scheppele, supra note 18, at 125; Strudler & Orts, supra note 18, at 382, 411, 428. See Schotland, 
supra note 17, at 1439. 
 20.  Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology  and Practice of Insider Trading Reg-
ulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1327–31 (1999). 
 21.  See Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 928 (2014). 
 22.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 7–14 (2d ed. 2007); STUART 
BANNER, SPECULATION: A HISTORY OF THE FINE LINE BETWEEN GAMBLING AND INVESTING 241–78 (2017); 
Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule—Insider Trading Under State Law, 45 ALA. L. 
REV. 753, 755–56 (1994); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents 
of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1295–96 (1998). 
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insider trading enforcement makes it impossible to assess the viability of con-
tractual approaches to insider trading.23 These critiques, however, do not con-
sider historical evidence from the period before SEC enforcement efforts.24 With 
respect to the acceptability of insider trading, many current commentators seem 
to assume the universality of modern societal norms,25 a seemingly implausible 
assumption given what we know about how views about morality shift over 
time26 and about how contested insider trading enforcement remains today.27 
The dearth of historical analysis is, perhaps, unsurprising given the fre-
quently expressed view that legal developments and scholarship in the 1960s 
revolutionized the approach to insider trading. Current scholars often assume that 
the terms of the modern debate began with the SEC’s first insider trading en-
forcement action in 196128 or with Manne’s economic analysis in 1966. Indeed, 
the insider trading literature is replete with claims that Manne’s novel economic 
approach “changed the terms of the debate” regarding insider trading, which had 
previously been mired in unhelpful discussions of fairness.29 Most of the volu-
minous insider trading literature remains squarely within the confines of the eco-
nomic approach Manne championed. 
The most notable exception to this ahistoricism was Manne himself, who 
argued that popular attitudes condemning insider trading are of relatively recent 
vintage and were the product of the SEC’s decision to use Rule 10b-5 to target 
the practice.30 Other scholars have offered similar theoretical accounts.31 In ear-
lier times, Manne claimed, market participants accepted unquestioningly that in-
siders with superior knowledge traded in the marketplace.32 Indeed, he began the 
 
 23. See Cox, supra note 12, at 636–37; Epstein, supra note 10, at 1490. 
 24.  See Cox, supra note 12, at 636–37; Epstein, supra note 10, at 1490. 
 25.  See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Dis-
closure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 308 (1998) (asserting that commentators and lawmakers “share the intuition 
that—regardless of the economic consequences—it is simply unfair for those with inside information to trade”); 
Strudler & Orts, supra note 18, at 377 n.6, 384 (asserting a “widely shared” moral intuition that insider trading 
was “wrong”). 
 26.  See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 179–80 
(2010). 
 27.  See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND 
THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 62–86 (2016). 
 28. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1319 (arguing that William Cary’s Cady, Roberts opinion “frames 
the subsequent intellectual history of insider trading regulation”). 
 29.  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 587 (Manne “changed the terms of the debate” in 1966 by 
placing it “almost exclusively in the language of economics”); Ronald A. Cass, One Among the Manne: Changing 
Our Course, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 204 (1999) (Manne’s insider trading scholarship was “novel” and 
“dramatically changed discourse about the issue”); Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Per-
spective, 50 CASE W. L. REV. 269, 269 (1999) (Manne “revolutionized” the “intellectual discourse concerning 
insider trading”). 
 30. Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, in 2 The Collected Works of Henry G. Manne 235, 
253–54 (Fred S. McChesney, ed. 2009). 
 31.  See Dan Kahan & Eric Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 365, 376–78 (1999) (suggesting that changes in how prosecutors ap-
proach insider trading might alter general beliefs about the morality of the behavior). 
 32. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
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first chapter of Insider Trading and the Stock Market with this categorical asser-
tion: “Prior to the year 1910 no one had ever publicly questioned the morality of 
corporate officers, directors, and employees trading shares of corporations.”33 
Later in his career, he would assert that there was “no evidence of any general 
revulsion by the business community or the public towards insider trading in 
those ‘good old days’”34 and that the public “has never shown any signs of losing 
confidence in the stock market because of the existence of insider trading.”35 
Manne’s broad generalizations have remained unchallenged and, for the 
most part, accepted in the legal academy. They are, however, incomplete and 
sometimes substantially inaccurate. Manne’s depiction of a time when insider 
trading was universally acknowledged and accepted probably never existed, and 
certainly not in the opening years of the twentieth century. We, of course, know 
(and Manne recognized) that by 1910, some courts had begun to change their 
approach to insider trading.36 While most courts continued to hold that managers 
were free to trade with shareholders when in possession of material nonpublic 
information,37 some found that the presence of “special facts” could lead to lia-
bility38 while others held that silence alone could constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty.39 What is less understood is that by 1910, some legal academics, econo-
mists, and financial journalists had begun to question more broadly the propriety 
of insider trading.40 Those concerns, however, were not confined to elite com-
mentators. Indeed, by that time, the United States had already had its first major 
insider trading scandal. In 1906, the directors of the Union Pacific Railroad were 
accused of delaying announcement of a dividend increase so that they could pur-
chase company shares before the expected price increase.41 While some com-
mentators continued to believe that this behavior was acceptable, for many ob-
servers the board had abused its power.42 The shift in attitudes regarding the 
propriety of insider trading began earlier than has previously been supposed and 
substantially preceded governmental enforcement efforts. 
A review of the turn-of-the-century literature also shows that modern eco-
nomic arguments about insider trading were not nearly so revolutionary as is 
generally believed today. By the late 1800s, commentators had already begun to 
premise their arguments for or against insider trading on the predicted effect that 
 
 33.  Id. at 9. 
 34.  Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 167, 175 (2005) [hereinafter Manne, Hayek]; see BANNER, supra note 22, at 241–45 (observing that 
insider trading remained a “normal, sound business practice” into the 1930s). 
 35.  See Manne, Law Professors, supra note 18, at 577. 
 36. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 9; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading 
and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473, 475 (1967) [hereinafter Manne, Administrative 
Process]. 
 37.  See Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 589–92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1868). 
 38.  See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). 
 39.  See Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 279–80 (Kan. 1904). 
 40. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origins of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 356–
58 (1991). 
 41.  MAURY KLEIN, UNION PACIFIC: THE REBIRTH 1894–1969, at 153–55 (1989). 
 42. See infra Section II.C. 
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the rule would have on the willingness of small investors to engage in stock mar-
ket transactions, on the incentives the rule created for business executives, on the 
efficient functioning of the capital markets, and on who should hold the property 
rights in information.43 Throughout this neglected history, one can find precur-
sors to most of the recurring arguments in the current insider trading debate. 
This Article seeks to recapture this lost history—to offer a deeper and more 
nuanced analysis of the social and intellectual history of insider trading, focusing 
specifically on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the stock 
exchange began to assume a more prominent role in the economy.44 What 
emerges from this analysis is a far more contested and complicated picture than 
the tidy history that to this point has been accepted by the legal academy. 
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part II begins by reviewing and refuting 
the historical evidence Manne offered regarding the uniform acceptance of in-
sider trading in the early 1900s. Manne was right in at least one respect—there 
was a widespread belief at the turn of the century that insider trading was en-
demic to securities markets. But as Part III shows, those beliefs were, for the 
most part, premised on very different views about how the stock market func-
tioned. The market was not efficient; stock price movements were almost exclu-
sively the product of the manipulative schemes of stock market professionals. 
Indeed, it was these perceptions regarding the prevalence of insider trading and 
manipulation that led many commentators to advise ordinary investors to avoid 
the equity markets lest they lose out to better informed insiders.45 The link be-
tween investor confidence and stock market participation was a common theme 
in discussions of insider trading during this time period. Brief concluding re-
marks follow. 
II. INSIDER TRADING AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In October 1904, shareholders discovered that tens of thousands of dollars 
were missing from the Lillooet Gold Dredging Company, and Mrs. M. V. Ham-
ilton, a young stenographer who worked at the firm, had recently been spending 
with abandon.46 Hamilton offered an innocent explanation for her new-found 
riches.47 She had not stolen the money, but she knew it was missing because of 
her access to internal corporate documents.48 Hamilton used her inside infor-
mation to sell the company’s stock short.49 The embezzler turned out to be the 
corporation’s general secretary.50 The company and its defrauded shareholders 
 
 43. See infra Section III.B. 
 44.  See infra Part III. 
 45. See infra Section III.A. 
 46.  Shortage Was Not News to Her, MINNEAPOLIS J., Oct. 5, 1904, at 12, https://chroniclingam-
erica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045366/1904-10-05/ed-1/seq-12/. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Iowa Lillooet Gold Mining Co. v. Bliss, 144 F. 446, 446–48 (N.D. Iowa 1906). 
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pressed their claims against him,51 and Mrs. Hamilton kept her stock market prof-
its. No one seemed to question the legitimacy of her actions. 
Manne did not discuss this anecdote, but it illustrates the world he believed 
existed before the SEC began to regulate insider trading and the myth that the 
legal academy has come to accept—a world in which insider trading was neither 
immoral nor improper, a world in which it was assumed that corporate insiders 
would take advantage of their superior access to information. While anecdotes 
like these are relatively easy to find, they depict only a portion of the complex, 
nuanced, and evolving attitudes regarding insider trading that existed in the early 
twentieth century. 
This Part offers a fuller account of those attitudes. It first examines the 
completeness and accuracy of Manne’s historical account. It then describes the 
work of several writers who challenged the propriety of insider trading at the turn 
of the twentieth century. Finally, this Part offers a case study of the insider trad-
ing scandal involving the Union Pacific railroad to illustrate how radically pop-
ular attitudes had begun to shift as stock ownership became more widespread. 
A. The World According to Henry Manne 
It might seem a bit misplaced to attack the historical underpinnings of In-
sider Trading and the Stock Market. After all, Manne was primarily making an 
economic argument. While his followers and his critics have engaged his argu-
ments almost exclusively on economic grounds, it remains important to test 
Manne’s historical claims for two reasons. First, Manne’s history has, to some 
degree, become the legal academy’s history, with many commentators unques-
tioningly repeating it52 or, at a minimum, tacitly accepting it as true. Second, 
Manne grounded his position for why insider trading should be permitted on a 
set of beliefs about how the stock market operated and how market participants 
viewed the practice before the SEC began to regulate it.53 By framing his argu-
ment in this way—insider trading was historically an accepted and universal 
practice that created no evident harm—Manne sought to strengthen the case for 
abolishing the SEC’s new-found restrictions.54 Even though Manne failed in his 
efforts to rollback insider trading prohibitions, his historical claims remain im-
portant. Widespread promulgation of a view that insider trading laws are simply 
a recent social construction imposed by misguided bureaucrats likely undermines 
the legitimacy of and compliance with those restrictions.55 Such views also likely 
 
 51.  Id. at 448; Miller v. Hawkeye Gold Dredging Co., 137 N.W. 507, 510 (Iowa 1912). 
 52.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Introduction to Manne, Inside Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 
2, at vii–viii; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trad-
ing, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1429 (1992) (referring to Manne’s “ubiquitously cited work” on insider trading and 
to Manne’s historical claims); Dooley, supra note 7, at 44–46; Kim, supra note 21, at 945–46; Macey, supra note 
29, at 269. 
 53. See generally Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 88–120. 
 54. See Manne, Administrative Process, supra note 36, at 489. 
 55.  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–32 (2006). See generally Kristina Murphy et al., 
Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When People Question the Legitimacy of the 
Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2009). 
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encourage academics to make proposals that weaken existing legal restrictions 
and inspire judges to narrowly interpret them. 
The origin of insider trading restrictions matter, not just because it is im-
portant to understand their origins but because of how they shape our approach 
to these laws today. Unfortunately, the historical evidence Manne offered to sup-
port his claim that they arose from the SEC in the 1960s (rather than evolving 
from shifting marketplace norms in the early twentieth century) was sketchy. His 
original analysis is quite brief, consisting of citations to a handful of cases and 
academic articles.56 Although much of it focused on the period from the 1920s 
through the 1940s, Manne made broad assertions about earlier periods. To sup-
port the claim that prior to 1910 “no one had ever publicly questioned the moral-
ity of corporate officers, directors, and employees trading shares of corpora-
tions,”57 Manne relied, not on his own research, but on a 1927 law review article 
by Columbia law professor Adolf A. Berle, Jr.58 But even that article was deriv-
ative. Berle claimed in 1910 that a law professor active in the Progressive move-
ment, H.L. Wilgus, was the first to challenge the common law’s permissive atti-
tude toward insider trading.59 Seemingly without looking beyond these two law 
review articles (and a New York Times article discussed in more detail below), 
Manne concluded that the “arguments against insider trading, interestingly 
enough, are not very old.”60 
Over the years, Manne would broaden his historical claims and sharpen his 
rhetoric. For example, in 2005 in one of his last full-length insider trading arti-
cles, Manne extended his claim by fifty years, contending that prior to the late 
1960s, “insider trading was very common, well-known, and generally accepted 
when it was thought about at all.”61 Business leaders, Manne argued, did not raise 
concerns about the practice, a silence that he thought was telling: 
It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling sharehold-
ers would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider 
trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the company, to 
 
 56.  Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 9–19, 26–33. His list of relevant cases 
contains only five decided before 1910. See id. at 200–01. Steve Thel has also examined conceptions of insider 
trading in the 1920s and 1930s. See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly 
Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 419 n.77 (1991) (discussing acceptability of insider trading in the busi-
ness and financial communities in the period before adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Steve 
Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 362–64 (1988). 
 57.  Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 9. 
 58.  Id. at 12. 
 59.  Relying on Berle’s description, Manne wrote that Wilgus’s 1910 “article collect[ed] the existing cases 
and comment[ed] on the then fresh U.S. Supreme Court decision in Strong v. Repide.” Manne, Insider Trading 
and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 12 (footnotes omitted). The relevant articles are Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Pub-
licity of Accounts and Directors’ Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1927) and H. L. Wilgus, Purchase 
of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1910). 
 60.  Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 12. 
 61.  See Henry G. Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2003, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104786934891514900. 
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investors, or to themselves. And it is equally inconceivable that they would 
not have recognized some harm if it existed.62 
Given that insider trading was widespread, but “studiously ignored by the 
business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regu-
lation,” the most likely inference was that it simply was not considered a prob-
lem.63 That silence (what Manne, borrowing from Sherlock Holmes, dubbed the 
“dog that did not bark”)64 should inform current debates. If “no one of signifi-
cance in the business world was ever heard to complain about [it], much less 
declare it to be the moral equivalent of murder or rape in the commercial area”65 
and if there was “no evidence of any general revulsion by the business commu-
nity or the public towards insider trading in those ‘good old days,’”66 then that 
was strong evidence that we should reconsider our approach to insider trading in 
light of the efficiency gains he claimed it provided. 
To be sure, Manne recognized in his later work that there were some pre-
1915 sources he had originally missed, in particular Congress’s Money Trust 
investigation in 1912–1913.67 But Manne remained convinced that those debates 
were unimportant. They focused too much on morality without any real appreci-
ation for the benefits he said insider trading provided.68 For Manne, the fact that 
no regulation resulted from these early criticisms supported his conclusion “that 
there was no serious public concern with insider trading.”69 As we shall see, 
Manne was wrong about the absence of public concern and about the lack of a 
regulatory response. 
Manne was largely right, however, about the common law approach, alt-
hough here, too, he downplayed the prevalence and significance of contrary ap-
proaches.70 Prior to 1900, courts almost uniformly held that directors and officers 
owed no duty to shareholders when they dealt in the corporation’s shares, even 
 
 62.  Manne, Hayek, supra note 34, at 174. 
 63.  Id. at 167, 174–77. 
 64. Id. at 174. 
 65.  Id. at 175. 
 66.  Id. Professors Prentice and Donelson have previously challenged Manne’s conclusion about the ac-
ceptability of insider trading prior to SEC enforcement efforts, but their analysis focuses primarily on sources 
from the 1920s. See Prentice & Donelson, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
 67.  The committee’s final report called for the stock exchanges to limit insider trading. “The scandalous 
practices of officers and directors in speculating upon inside and advance information as to the action of their 
corporations may be curtailed if not stopped” if the exchanges required “complete publicity” regarding corporate 
affairs. H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, pt. 3, at 115 (1913) [hereinafter MONEY TRUST REPORT]. For an overview of the 
Money Trust investigation, see Richard N. Sheldon, The Pujo Investigation, 1912, in III CONGRESS 
INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 1792–1974 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns, eds., 1975). 
This Article does not discuss the Pujo investigation in any significant detail, as the committee’s work has been 
thoroughly documented elsewhere. Instead, it focuses on critiques and discussions of insider trading that pre-
dated those hearings. 
 68. Manne, Hayek, supra note 34, at 175. 
 69.  Id. at 175 n.33. Manne argued instead that “insider trading regulation had its primordial introduction 
in the muck of New Deal securities regulation.” Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, supra note 61. 
 70.  See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 1220 (“After 1900 . . . the trend was towards the special circumstances 
rule and, to a lesser extent, the fiduciary duty rule.”). 
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if they were in possession of material nonpublic information.71 Those holdings 
were premised on both formal reasoning and on a judicial reluctance to interfere 
with what were viewed as the prerogatives of officers and directors.72 As a formal 
matter, directors and officers owed a fiduciary duty to the corporate entity, not 
to each individual shareholder,73 and so corporate officials were thought to be 
free to buy and sell stock “like any other individual.”74 Silence alone was not 
considered wrongful, either legally or morally.75 Instead, most commentators 
viewed a director or officer as being fully “entitled to the benefit of his facilities 
for information.”76 In modern terms, courts assigned the property right in the 
information to the corporation’s managers. The only circumstances in which cor-
porate officials could be liable to the shareholders with whom they dealt were 
when they made affirmative misrepresentations, when they fraudulently con-
cealed material facts, or in the presence of a variety of “special facts,” the pres-
ence of which necessitated disclosure.77 
The initial approach to insider trading, however, was not without its critics. 
Manne’s work never discussed a growing body of literature (both inside and out-
side the legal academy) and so created an inaccurate impression of uniformity. 
In reality, as far back as 1877 (more than thirty years before Wilgus’s article), 
legal commentators questioned the common law approach. Writing the twelfth 
edition of Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, Jairus Perry 
sought to place the burden on directors to show that their trading profits had not 
come from the “intimate knowledge” they obtained from their positions.78 Most 
often, these critiques were premised on morality. Treatise writer Henry Osborn 
 
 71.  See Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cty. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 513 (Ind. 1873); Krumbhaar v. 
Griffiths, 25 A. 64, 70 (Pa. 1892); Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525, 528 (1873); Haarstick v. Fox, 33 P. 251, 253 
(Utah 1893). For a contrary earlier example, see Adm’r of Spence v. Whitaker, 3 Port. 297, 325–26 (Ala. 1836). 
 72. See, e.g., Haarstick, 33 P. at 253. 
 73.  Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cty., 44 Ind. at 514–16. Not all courts agreed. See Oliver v. Oliver, 45 
S.E. 232, 233 (Ga. 1903) (“[T]he fact that [the director] is a trustee for all is not to be perverted into holding that 
he is under no obligation to each . . . . No process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy the fact 
that the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder.”). 
 74.  WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 354 (2d ed. 1889). 
 75.  See Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426, 427 (N.J. 1891). 
 76.  See COOK, supra note 74, at 354–55 (“The information [the director] has of the affairs of the corpora-
tion, whereby he is enabled to buy or sell at an advantage over the person with whom he deals, does not affect 
the validity of the transaction.”). The law with respect to directors and officers mirrored the rule the Supreme 
Court laid down in 1817 for ordinary commercial transactions. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 178, 195 
(1817) (holding that party to contract not required to disclose information to counterparty “where the means of 
intelligence are equally accessible to both”). How broadly the rule of caveat emptor should be applied in com-
mercial transactions, however, was also the subject of significant dispute and controversy in the nineteenth cen-
tury. See BANNER, supra note 22, at 245–52. 
 77.  See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431–33 (1909); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 587–88 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1868). 
 78.  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA 225 n.1 (12th ed. 1877) (“[W]here the director, either in the purchase or sale of the shares of the com-
pany gained an unequal advantage over the ordinary shareholder, it would be very natural to infer that such 
advantage might have been gained, more or less, by his position, and the more intimate knowledge consequent 
upon it, unless the contrary was made very clearly to appear by the proof.”). 
  
962 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
Taylor, for example, noted in 1905 that insider trading transactions were “emi-
nently unfair” and “of questionable propriety.”79 But a few commentators made 
normative arguments similar to those raised by contemporary scholars. For ex-
ample, in 1896, Seymour Thompson, a judge and treatise writer, offered what 
amounted to an agency cost argument when he suggested that the rule permitting 
insider trading created precisely the wrong incentives for corporate officials be-
cause it encouraged them to put their own financial returns ahead of sharehold-
ers’ interests.80 In other words, allowing insider trading would create incentives 
for executives to engage in private corruption, what Sung Hui Kim has recently 
dubbed “self-regarding gain.”81 
Cases that Manne dismissed as based only on vague moral assertions also 
raised consequentialist issues that remain at the heart of the modern insider trad-
ing debate. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Oliver v. Ol-
iver82 (the first to recognize insider trading as a breach of fiduciary duty) can be 
read as a case about property rights in information. The court recognized that 
material nonpublic information was a “quasi asset” of the corporation.83 As we 
shall see in the next Section, the question of how corporate law should assign 
such property rights was crucial during this time period because ownership of 
railroads and industrial companies was beginning to shift from private to public 
with a concomitant increase in the information asymmetries investors encoun-
tered.84 It was for that reason that the court in Oliver found that directors held 
such “information in trust for the benefit of those who placed him where this 
knowledge was obtained, in the well-founded expectation that the same should 
be used first for the company, and ultimately for those who were the real owners 
of the company.”85 
These examples (and others discussed in more detail below) show the in-
completeness of Manne’s discussion of late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury sources. But the breadth of his research is only one source of concern. 
Manne cites only one nonlegal source for his claim about the broad acceptance 
 
 79.  See HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 692 n.1 (5th ed. 
1905) (“The transaction which in this case was allowed to stand seems to the writer to have been eminently un-
fair, and indeed a rule—for which this decision is certainly authority—that directors in their dealings with share-
holders are entitled to take advantage of their knowledge of facts not known to the latter, but which the directors 
are acquainted with by reason of their official position, seems of questionable propriety.”); see also JOHN 
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA § 1090 (2d ed. 1892) (arguing that directors were “quasi or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with 
respect to their shares of stock”); JAMES HART PURDY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
1098 (1905) (“A director’s relations are so far fiduciary with a stockholder to whom he is selling shares, that he 
is bound to reveal to the stockholder all material facts to him known affecting the value of the stock, and which 
are unknown to the stockholder.”). 
 80.  See 3 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 4034 (1896) 
(stating that the majority rule “proceeds upon a conception which, if extended, would sanction nearly all of the 
fraud and injustice which the managers of corporations have committed against the stockholders”). 
 81.  See Kim, supra note 21, at 934. 
 82. 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903). 
 83. Id. at 234. 
 84.  See infra Part III. 
 85.  Oliver, 45 S.E. at 234. 
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of insider trading in the early twentieth century, “a survey by the New York 
Times in 1915” which purportedly found that “90 per cent of business executives 
interviewed admitted to trading regularly in their own company’s shares.”86 The 
“survey,” however, was nothing of the sort. It was simply a selection of six re-
sponses the Times received when it questioned an unspecified number of “men 
known the country over for their active participation in financial and corporate 
affairs” about their views on insider trading.87 To be sure, the Times concluded 
that “[a]ll but a very few held that a director has a right to use the information 
which comes to him in the board room for his own profit.”88 But the Times did 
not tally the responses it received, and even the printed excerpts did not indicate 
that 90% engaged in insider trading. The only reference to that figure was an 
unnamed state bank chairman who guessed that, as a matter of personal ethics, 
10% of directors “never buy or sell to take advantage of coming price changes.”89 
But that was nothing but pure conjecture, not the product of a “survey” of “busi-
ness executives.” 
While hardly a scientific poll, the article nonetheless provides an important 
glimpse into elite public opinion in the business community. But to conclude 
from it, as Manne does, that business executives were overwhelmingly in favor 
of insider trading does not do justice to the nuances the interviews expressed. 
Attitudes were not unvarying, even among that small sample of business leaders. 
And why did the Times feel it was necessary to conduct these interviews? They 
came in the wake of a scandal a few weeks earlier in which the directors of the 
United Rubber Company allegedly delayed disclosing a dividend decision so that 
they could trade on the information.90 Even the title (Should Directors Specu-
late?) suggested that the issue was subject to substantial dispute.91 What is most 
apparent from these interviews is that the executives seemed to know that insider 
trading was no longer an unquestioned management prerogative, and they admit-
ted that if directors were “Christian gentlemen with a very fine sense of honor” 
they would not trade.92 
That same executive the Times interviewed who guessed about the percent-
age of directors who refrained from trading, conceded that there was a substantial 
evolution underway in what was considered acceptable behavior. There was 
“much less speculation than there used to be,” a transformation that he believed 
was largely for the better.93 And while the line between appropriate and inappro-
priate behavior remained uncertain, other business leaders were beginning to 
draw meaningful distinctions by focusing, for example, on the materiality of the 
 
 86.  Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, supra note 2, at 10 (citing Should Directors Speculate?, 
ANNALIST, Jul. 19, 1915, at 65). 
 87.  Should Directors Speculate, supra note 86, at 65. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Passing a Dividend, ANNALIST, Jul. 5, 1915, at 5. United Rubber was a reprise of the Union Pacific 
scandal addressed in Section II.C. 
 91. See Should Directors Speculate, supra note 86, at 65. 
 92.  Id. 
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information. A “self-made man of Wall Street” who was “the head of one of the 
great financial institutions of the country” opined: 
I am not sure that if a dividend is about to be passed the Directors have the 
right to sell their stock, or if a valuable contract is about to be entered into 
that they have the right to buy before the news is given out, but no rigid 
rule can be drawn against a Director’s increasing or reducing his hold-
ings.94 
Another interviewee argued that “a Director should not sell or buy on im-
portant news affecting his company until it has been publicly announced” be-
cause it was only then that “all stockholders, theoretically at least, would have 
equal chance with the Director for turning the news to market advantage.”95 This 
ongoing evolution in business norms seemed to govern all managerial insider 
trading, especially trading on impersonal, secondary markets.96 
Just two weeks earlier, the same publication described insider trading by 
directors as a “strange code of morals” that ran counter to stockholders’ rights 
and suggested that qualms about it were not novel.97 
It is well enough to say that a Director has the same right as any other 
stockholder to buy or sell in the open market. So he has, but he has no 
greater right than any other stockholder. What he learns as a Director he 
has no right to use for his own benefit until all other stockholders have an 
equal chance to use that same information. It is as a stockholder that he 
buys or sells. As a Director he should do neither, for what he learns as a 
Director he holds in trust for all the stockholders until it has been made 
known to all. There is nothing new in all this, but unfortunately to some 
Directors, it will sound like some new and strange doctrine.98 
In a separate article focusing on trading at United Rubber, the Times concluded 
that “more people in Wall Street agree” that directors did not have the right to 
trade ahead of unannounced changes in a corporation’s dividend rate.99 Insider 
trading was “harmful” to the reputation of the company, both inside the financial 
community and among ordinary investors.100 Companies that allowed their di-
rectors to trade were held in lower “esteem” than those that did not.101 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  The emergence of these norms at the turn of the century is particularly interesting in light of what is 
generally believed to be the predominant common law approach. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 
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2003). 
 97. ANNALIST, July 5, 1915, at 3. 
 98.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 99.  Passing a Dividend, supra note 90, at 5. 
 100. Id. 
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For this reason, some elite business leaders were (contrary to Manne’s con-
tention) beginning to rethink the propriety of insider trading, although they often 
faced resistance from their own directors. The most notable example was Elbert 
Gary, the chairman of U.S. Steel.102 The first corporation with a billion-dollar 
market capitalization, U.S. Steel had been formed in early 1901 with the merger 
of a number of previously competing steel companies.103 Gary surprised the di-
rectors at the end of that first year of operation, when he proposed to not only 
release publicly the company’s financial statements but to make them available 
to shareholders at the same time they were made available to directors—in the 
late afternoon after the market had closed.104 Gary believed that directors should 
have “no better opportunity on the market than the public at large.”105 This pol-
icy, according to Gary’s biographer, Ida Tarbell, “outraged” several board mem-
bers (including Henry Clay Frick) who were accustomed to getting advance in-
formation on other boards.106 “Some of them,” Tarbell noted, “had added 
handsome slices to their fortunes by this kind of maneuvering.”107 
Gary, however, “had rigid ideas on this matter” and liked to present himself 
as a modern and progressive business leader.108 His “Methodist training” and 
legal background could make him “overly serious and pompous”109 but also in-
jected a Christian morality into his decision-making. Gary did not think that the 
corporation should be “managed for the stock market,” and he objected to direc-
tors speculating in company stock: 
I always thought this use of inside information by directors—very common 
at the time—was akin to robbery of their own stockholders, and I had no 
hesitation in making my disapproval of it so clear that everybody on the 
board would understand. . . . It was wrong in principle and it set a bad ex-
ample. How could we expect our officers and employees not to speculate 
if the members of the board did.110 
Gary’s views were certainly not universal, but they illustrate, especially in light 
of the Times interviews, that, contrary to Manne’s contention, elite business lead-
ers did not uniformly view insider trading as legitimate. Subsequent critiques of 
insider trading enforcement have, unfortunately, premised their analyses on 
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Manne’s impoverished view of the historical record and have inaccurately con-
cluded that firms had “made little, if any attempt to prohibit insider trading.”111 
The U.S. Steel example is important for another reason—it shows that rec-
ognizing that attitudes about insider trading were complicated and contested long 
before SEC enforcement efforts began does not require rejecting the contractar-
ian approach Manne advocated. As Richard Epstein has recently argued, “the 
risks of fraud and manipulation are so deadly to the market that private firms 
have every incentive to seek out the optimal solution to insider trading . . . in 
order to preserve the value of their shares.”112 Professor Epstein recognized that 
the comprehensive governmental regulation that exists today makes it difficult 
to demonstrate empirically that firms would adopt private ordering mechanisms 
to address insider trading,113 but that is precisely what Gary was doing at U.S. 
Steel. The firm engendered a good deal of controversy when it was launched, 
and many critics charged that the shareholders were the victims of a giant scam 
intended to enrich the founders and promoters of the enterprise.114 Given the 
company’s reliance on the capital markets—it had the largest capitalization of 
any publicly traded company—it should not be surprising that Gary would rec-
ognize the importance of promoting the belief among investors that they would 
not invariably lose out to informed insiders. The stock was one of the most ac-
tively traded on Wall Street, and the ability of the firm to signal credibly to in-
vestors that it was limiting insider trading could be expected to increase investor 
demand for the shares, particularly in a market otherwise thought to be domi-
nated by such trading.115 Maintaining a liquid market in U.S. Steel shares also 
benefitted J.P Morgan & Co. and other U.S. Steel underwriters, which were paid 
in stock for their investment banking services.116 Gary’s solution, a mix of rules 
and norms that would discourage insider trading at a firm likely to suffer sub-
stantial harm from it, is precisely what contractarians predict would happen in 
the absence of external regulation.117 
The interviews in the Times and other commentary from the time period 
suggest the possibility that similar norms may have been forming at other public 
companies. For example, economist William Z. Ripley, writing in 1905, ob-
served that one of the “peculiar evils in corporate finance” was the problem of 
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“speculative management.”118 Ripley acknowledged the difficulty of distinguish-
ing “recklessness” from “downright dishonesty,” and his views on stock com-
pensation are clearly out of step with modern practices.119 The “best” companies, 
he wrote, “prohibit dealings in the securities of a company by its own officers.”120 
For Ripley, insider trading was simply a byproduct of the absence of mandatory 
disclosure. “Secrecy,” he wrote, “is a constant invitation to the insider to take 
advantage of forthcoming events at the expense of the stockholders.”121 
How extensive actual limitations on trading by directors or officers were 
remains uncertain. U.S. Steel and perhaps a few other companies may have been 
outliers, driven by size and trading volume to impose restrictions on managers 
that other firms did not adopt or would not consider. As we will see with the 
Union Pacific insider trading scandal, large market capitalization and substantial 
trading volume were apparently insufficient, standing alone, to cause all firms 
with those characteristics to adopt such private ordering mechanisms.122 Addi-
tional research could explore this issue in greater detail, illuminating whether, in 
a world without pervasive insider trading enforcement, multiple firms developed 
such mechanisms to address the potential costs and benefits of permitting mana-
gerial insider trading or whether they largely eschewed such devices in favor of 
maintaining this private benefit of control. 
B. The Morality of Insider Trading 
In 1904, the financial writer Edwin Lefèvre tackled the subject of insider 
trading. Over the previous seven years, Lefèvre had written extensively about 
Wall Street, first as a financial reporter for a New York newspaper and later turn-
ing to magazine features and short stories.123 Although his best-known work, 
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator,124 the thinly disguised biography of Jesse 
Livermore, was not published until 1923, Lefèvre was already a well-established 
market commentator when he wrote Use and Abuse of Inside Information for the 
Saturday Evening Post.125 
Lefèvre would eventually conclude that nearly all of the “Captains of fi-
nance” were “utterly unconscious of moral turpitude or wrongdoing” and blind 
to “the rights and feelings of the individual.”126 He seemed less certain in 1904 
about the immorality of directors trading ahead of soon to be announced mergers 
or dividend changes.127 Such things, he assured readers, were commonplace.128 
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In fact, he provided some support for Manne’s position, stating that insider trad-
ing was “taken as a matter of course, without indignation, without even passing 
comment.”129 He could think of only a single instance where a large corporation 
increased its dividend without the stock price increasing before the announce-
ment.130 He knew the practice was not illegal and conceded that it might not even 
be immoral, “though it would seem to be that.”131 Like Professor Kim, Lefèvre 
likened insider trading to political graft, by which he meant that in both cases 
individuals were selected to serve the interests of others, not for personal gain.132 
But Lefèvre’s primary objection seems to have been a gentleman’s concern for 
conduct that was unfair and unsporting. Insider traders played the game with 
“loaded dice.”133 They took advantage of the weak in an unseemly and “vulgar” 
pursuit for money.134 
A year later, Thomas F. Woodlock, one of the leading financial writers in 
the country, tried to make a more forceful case against insider trading. Serving 
as an editor of the Wall Street Journal from 1902 to 1905, Woodlock was a man 
of varied interests and experience, writing extensively on railroad financing, the 
financial markets, and Catholicism before serving for five years on the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.135 He was not afraid to let those various worlds inter-
twine. As the New York Times observed, “both in his writings and in his conver-
sation on economic or political subjects he would unashamedly begin with a re-
ligious or a moral premise, and base his conclusions on it.”136 To his colleagues 
at the Wall Street Journal, Woodlock was a man “of rare moral stature.”137 
Indeed, Woodlock’s 1905 essay on insider trading was entitled Morality in 
Wall Street.138 While Woodlock recognized the utility of speculation (a hotly 
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contested issue at the turn of the twentieth century),139 for him the fiduciary re-
lationship that existed between the corporation’s managers and shareholders 
made insider trading inherently improper, although he too lends support to 
Manne’s view that such trading was ubiquitous and accepted, at least in certain 
circles.140 
I dislike to bring a general indictment against a person or a community, but 
the plain fact is that in Wall Street speculation by insiders for their own 
exclusive personal profit is the rule. . . . My observation compels me to the 
conclusion that the “insider” who does not use his official position for his 
personal profit by means of speculation is extremely rare. Furthermore the 
Wall Street community cynically expects him to do so, and in no way 
blames him when he does it.141 
As a result of this toleration, insider trading was the “most common defect” 
among “Wall Street speculators.”142 Substantial news items likely to affect secu-
rities prices, he observed, “are usually foreshadowed in market movements long 
before they are finally announced. The implication is that ‘insiders’ are exploit-
ing their own interest engaged for their own benefit in the market before permit-
ting the general public to know as much as they do.”143 
Woodlock, however, saw no reason why corporate officials should be per-
mitted to exploit those informational advantages.144 To be sure, Woodlock’s 
analysis contained a healthy dose of Christian morality, but he also mirrored 
modern analyses of insider trading by focusing on property rights in information. 
Directors owe shareholders a fiduciary duty, and the information in their posses-
sion came to them “by virtue of their official position, which is conferred upon 
them by the stockholders.”145 These advantages “arising from fiduciary relations 
are not the personal property of the individual who derives them as trustee, but 
come to him as trustee.”146 Whether he used this information against the share-
holders or not, Woodlock concluded that the director had “no moral right” to use 
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the information for his own personal profit.147 Any indirect profits from using 
the information would properly belong to the corporation.148 
Woodlock’s analysis was remarkably similar to the modern contours of in-
sider trading law. For example, he saw tipping as equally problematic as trading, 
using the same moral and property rights claims he employed elsewhere.149 “The 
advantage,” he explained, was simply not “theirs to use or to give away at their 
good pleasure.”150 Professor Epstein recently made the same point as Woodlock 
when he advocated replacing the rules about tipper/tippee liability with the law 
of constructive trusts.151 Unlike tipper liability, which requires a personal benefit 
to impose liability on the tipper, constructive trust law would impose liability 
simply because the trustee does not have the power or authority to give away the 
trust assets.152 
Like modern courts, Woodlock saw no basis for imposing an equal access 
rule, and he drew a sharp distinction between “expert knowledge of values” and 
“early information”: 
We are, I think, quite safe in assuming that, provided a man is morally 
competent to buy or sell the securities in which he speculates, not being 
restricted by pecuniary or fiduciary relations, and provided that he legiti-
mately obtained his information and attempts no direct or indirect decep-
tion against the other man, he is entirely justified in making the contract. It 
is true that he may have an advantage which chance or superior enterprise 
or ability may have given him, but why is he not morally entitled thereto?153 
Other writers followed Woodlock’s lead, although they objected to insider trad-
ing almost exclusively on moral grounds.154 
Those condemnations, not surprisingly, increased after the Panic of 1907. 
As another writer noted in the spring of 1909, around the same time as the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Strong v. Repide155 (that Court’s articulation of the 
“special facts” doctrine): 
There is nothing more sordid in Wall Street than the use that is made in the 
stock market by insiders (directors, bankers, and their like) of information 
accessible only to themselves. They have the first information of changes 
in earnings; they are able to anticipate dividend changes months ahead; 
they know what financial transactions are impending, as, for instance, an 
increase of stock.156 
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Consistent with the common law cases such as Oliver v. Oliver, insider trading 
was, in this view, improper even in situations where the corporate officials did 
not manipulate the stock or even in the absence of “special facts.”157 
Woodlock returned to the topic again in 1909, and that later essay contains 
some hints that popular attitudes were changing. In The Ethics of Speculation, 
Woodlock responded to an argument that the “existence of a free and open mar-
ket for securities destroys altogether the trust-relationship between” shareholders 
and directors.158 Twenty-four years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Goodwin v. Aggasiz,159 held that directors could trade in impersonal 
secondary markets without fear of violating their fiduciary duty to shareholders, 
but Woodlock took the opposite approach. He contended that “public opinion 
would not tolerate the action of directors who would speculate upon the strength 
of a dividend just ordered by them, but not yet announced to the public.”160 Still, 
Woodlock recognized the uncertainty in current ethical standards. Insider trading 
continued to exist in something of a netherworld in 1909, although support for 
prohibiting it seemed to be gaining strength: 
There is undoubtedly a large territory of business relationships arising from 
modern methods of corporate enterprise which has not yet been fully sur-
veyed and mapped in an ethical sense and this matter of ‘directors,’ or ‘in-
side’ speculation falls partly in this territory. At present it is under a kind 
of provisional government with the principle caveat emptor as its main 
constitution. Perhaps some day the standard of strict honesty may more 
closely approximate the standard of honor than it now does. It is to be 
hoped that it will.161 
Woodlock’s hope would not be fully realized for another half century, but what 
is clear is that by 1910, significant figures in the business community had raised 
substantial concerns about the propriety of insider trading.162 
C. The Union Pacific Dividend Scandal 
The analysis has so far focused on generalized statements about the preva-
lence of insider trading and changing conceptions about whether it was accepta-
ble for directors and officers of public companies to engage in it. The catalog has 
centered primarily on elite legal and financial commentators and business lead-
ers. Manne’s historical claims, however, were not so limited. He argued that 
there was “no evidence of any general revulsion by . . . the public towards insider 
trading in those ‘good old days.’”163 Subsequent legal scholars have accepted 
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that view, repeating uncritically that “popular attitudes towards corporate moral-
ity did not until recently condemn insider trading.”164 The overwhelming public 
reaction to one such episode, however, is inconsistent with that assertion, and a 
discussion of that scandal helps to contextualize the shifting insider trading 
norms during this period. 
In 1906, the Union Pacific Railroad and its sister line the Southern Pacific 
were considered among the best run, most efficient, and most profitable railroads 
in the country.165 Edward Henry Harriman had gained control of the bankrupt 
Union Pacific eight years earlier, his first full-time foray into railroads.166 By the 
summer of 1906, Harriman had become one of the country’s most notorious and 
most reviled business leaders.167 In an age when one of the biggest public policy 
issues was how the government could rein in monopolies, muckraking journalists 
and progressive politicians charged that Harriman held sway over too much of 
the country’s infrastructure.168 
The enmity Harriman engendered came from another source as well, the 
rapidly growing intolerance during the Progressive Era for capitalism unre-
strained by at least some governmental control. Otto Kahn—a leading invest-
ment banker who worked closely with Harriman—thought that Harriman’s belief 
in “unfettered individualism” was out of step with the political temper of the 
times.169 The “people appear determined,” Kahn wrote shortly after Harriman’s 
death in 1909, “to put limits and restraints upon the exercise of economic power 
and over-lordship, just as in former days they put limits and restraints upon the 
absolutism of rulers.”170 It hardly seems coincidental that these public policy 
concerns occurred simultaneously with changing views about the propriety of 
insider trading at public companies.  
The manner in which the Union and Southern Pacific approached a change 
in their dividend policies in the summer of 1906 was emblematic of that ongoing 
transformation. Although extremely profitable, Harriman had, to that point, re-
invested most of the companies’ profits into upgrading the railroads.171 The Un-
ion Pacific paid its stockholders a 5% quarterly dividend; the Southern Pacific 
paid no dividends.172 Although rumors had begun that a dividend increase was 
forthcoming, a great deal of uncertainty remained, in no small part because the 
railroads were still grappling with the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake 
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earlier that year and because Harriman, who dominated the boards of both com-
panies, had such a well-developed reputation for paying low dividends.173 On 
Friday, August 17, 1906, the railroads surprised the market when the Union Pa-
cific announced it would double its dividend and the Southern Pacific announced 
it would pay a 5% quarterly dividend.174 The share prices of both companies rose 
substantially in the days after the announcement.175 
Commentators criticized the boards of both companies, focusing not on the 
dividends themselves but on two aspects of the announcement. First, as would 
eventually become clear, Harriman had told the Union Pacific board at its July 
meeting that he wanted to raise the dividend at the next board meeting.176 What 
was not clear at the time was that Harriman had told at least one director earlier 
in the spring that he planned to raise dividends.177 It was at that point that Harri-
man and director Henry Clay Frick (the same man who complained about not 
receiving advanced financial information as a director of U.S. Steel) began to 
jointly purchase shares and agreed to split the profits from those purchases.178 
Given Harriman’s dominance of the board, an eventual dividend increase seemed 
like a foregone conclusion. There were suspicions at the time that this kind of 
trading occurred. In fact, there was widespread media speculation that Harriman, 
his fellow board members, and various tippees obtained substantial profits from 
the early information.179 Second, the board finalized the dividend decision on 
August 15, but delayed announcing it until August 17.180 Commentators gener-
ally asserted that both delays were intended to and did allow insiders and tippees 
to earn substantial profits from early receipt of the information,181 precisely the 
kind of disclosure delay modern commentators predict would occur if law did 
not prohibit insider trading. 
If Manne were correct about the acceptability of insider trading before 
1910, then these delays and the trading assumed to be associated with them 
would not have engendered any significant criticism. But that was not the case. 
Instead, the directors’ actions were almost universally derided as a “wrongful use 
of corporate power” and a “betrayal of trust.”182 Otto Kahn observed that the 
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trading (along with Harriman’s monopoly power in certain segments of the rail-
road industry) created a “hysteria of fury against him [that] swept over the 
land.”183 Harriman and the other directors were “denounced and anathematized 
as a horrible example of capitalistic greed and lawbreaking.”184 In fact, the drum-
beat of criticism was so intense, that Harriman actually offered to resign as a 
director of the National City Bank of New York.185 The bank, he wrote, “should 
not be exposed to any criticism because” he sat on its board.186 The bank’s chair-
man, James Stillman, thought that the railroad leader was too “valuable” to the 
bank and “too much esteemed by [his] co-directors” to allow him to resign.187 
Echoing Kahn, Stillman argued that Harriman was just the latest target in the 
much larger muckraking campaign against all business leaders.188 “It is quite im-
material,” Stillman replied, “which one of us is singled out at any particular time, 
the rest of us get the same treatment at other times.”189 
Although clearly part of a broader Progressive Era campaign against un-
checked corporate power, many newspapers focused on insider trading as a par-
ticularly important problem for promoting investor confidence in publicly traded 
corporations. The Union Pacific episode struck “a grave blow . . . against confi-
dence in railroad management and the control of great corporations generally” 
and even harmed the “prestige of American securities abroad.”190 In London, the 
Economist praised Harriman’s management, but criticized the manner in which 
the dividends were declared.191 “But when that prosperity is turned to the private 
advantage of a few speculators, who can postpone dividend announcements, de-
clare what dividends they please, buy or sell at their own sweet will, the danger 
of gambling with these loaded-dice merchants stands out with a certain clear-
ness.”192 With management willing to engage in such behavior and no require-
ment for companies to disclose accurate and timely information, the average in-
vestor, another paper opined, was better off in Monte Carlo.193 As discussed in 
more detail in the next Part, that gambling imagery was prevalent in turn of the 
century stock market descriptions.194 
Most of the commentary focused on the delay between the August 15 board 
meeting and the official announcement on August 17. Arguably, this delay might 
have fit within the existing prohibitions against directorial fraud. Indeed, some 
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commentators viewed the delay as standard stock manipulation, not insider trad-
ing. “Not in years,” The Evening Star in Washington, D.C. observed, “has Wall 
Street been treated to such a scandalous episode. Even in the palmy days of the 
Goulds, Fisks and Drews no parallel can be found for such a glaring piece of 
manipulating stock jobbing.”195 “The coup was worked,” the Times Dispatch in 
Roanoke explained, “by blinding the street to the probable action of the direc-
tors.”196 The company led investors into believing that there would be only a 
small increase. “Against this backdrop, the announcement was like a thunderbolt 
from a clear sky.”197 
But even those commentators who conceded that the company had not lied 
to investors—had in fact kept silent—remained troubled. The New York Times 
reported “outspoken denunciations” of the board’s delay, which gave insiders a 
“golden opportunity” to “reap a rich harvest in the market at the expense of the 
great bulk of stockholders who had been kept in ignorance . . . until E. H. Harri-
man was ready to make the announcement.”198 For the Times, what made the 
criticism all the more remarkable was the “apparently absolute unanimity of 
opinion on the subject.”199 There was a building consensus that the Union Pacific 
insiders, by delaying the dividend announcement had made tens of millions of 
dollars and had managed to pull off “the most remarkable coup in the street’s 
history;” in the words of the New York Tribune, “one of the biggest and most 
downright pieces of stock jobbery ever known.”200 
Throughout the coverage, one theme resonated consistently—whatever the 
law permitted, directors were now expected to behave differently than they had 
in the past. The New York Sun encapsulated what many other observers noted: 
In former times it was said, when there was a different idea of the respon-
sibility of directors, such practices as making a definite statement of policy 
by way of encouraging stockholders to dispose of their stock and then 
adopting a different policy for the individual profit of the directors passed 
as brilliant coups and attracted little criticism. The situation now is differ-
ent. Now, it is said, a director’s obligations to his stockholders constitute 
nothing more or less than a breach of trust.201 
Taking advantage of advance information was no different than any other kind 
of graft or corruption, and engaging in it could no longer be justified by notions 
of laissez faire or social Darwinism, both of which still pervaded the thinking of 
elite business leaders.202 Trading directors, The Nation observed, “display a 
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greed, a brutality, a disregard of the rights of others, a cynical belief in the law 
of the stronger” that should no longer be tolerated.203 When directors traded on 
inside information or tipped their friends and family, they acted immorally. If 
directors could not be trusted to look out for shareholder interests, investors 
should think twice about putting their money in the stock market. What assurance 
did the public have, the Sun noted, “that a stock in control of a gambling element 
and bulled by it may not in the future be beared by it?”204 
Insider trading “was a clear abuse of power,” which, the Railroad Gazette 
observed, was closely tied to the absence of regular disclosure obligations.205 
Mirroring Gary’s approach at U.S. Steel, the journal argued that corporations 
should be required to disclose important news immediately, “thus giving, as far 
as possible, a fair chance to every one to act on the news.”206 Otherwise, concerns 
about unchecked corporate power would continue. 
As long as a great railroad leader has the chance and takes it to make mil-
lions of dollars at the expense of the stockholders, who are themselves help-
less to foresee the future, depending alone upon his individual will, so long 
will hostility to corporations be rampant. A peaceful solution of the corpo-
ration question can only come when loaded dice are eliminated from cor-
poration management.207 
Criticism about insider trading at Union Pacific was particularly fierce out-
side New York, especially in the Midwest, where the same political forces that 
would soon give rise to the first blue sky laws were at play.208 The papers there 
reported the “savage criticism” and “hot hatred” of Harriman from “all sides,” 
and opined on how unfairly the insiders at the railroad had treated stockhold-
ers.209 “The universal verdict,” the Omaha Bee reported, “is one of condemnation 
of the deal, as a gigantic breach of trust, whereby the knowledge of trustees was 
used to beat stockholders out of unnumbered millions.”210 
But it was not just progressive newspapers who viewed insider trading as 
unacceptable. The New York Times, at the time a staid defender of the status quo, 
remarked that “any Director who used his information to procure any investor’s 
stock is guilty of something worse than indiscretion. . . . It is nothing short of a 
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breach of trust to make market use of official information.”211 If directors could 
not resist the temptation to trade, then there should be legal restraints on their 
ability to do so. The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial dripping with sarcasm, 
assumed that the “honorable” Union Pacific directors must not have used this 
“tremendous bit of knowledge” because “[i]f they had done so they would have 
been not one whit less culpable than would the trustee who swindled his cli-
ent.”212 The price run up, the editors suggested, must have been a “remarkable 
coincidence” or an “intensely interesting . . . study in spontaneous activity.”213 
The paper was not exactly sympathetic to the needs of public investors, but it 
recognized that those needs now took precedence. Declaring that enormous div-
idend should have been the greatest day of Harriman’s life, the Journal observed: 
“In his hour of triumph, however, he trampled upon some small prerogatives of 
the great, blind, stupid public. Therefore, of course, the public forgot everything 
but its own rights—and what should have been a day of Harriman triumph be-
came a day of public vituperation.”214 
Even some on Wall Street saw that the rules governing the behavior of of-
ficers and directors simply had to change. Elbert Gary was apparently not alone. 
The Times reported: 
Conservative bankers whose names, if they could be used, would add great 
weight to the opinions expressed said unhesitatingly that the Union Pacific 
incident had furnished proof of the imperative need of rendering impossi-
ble in the future that Directors should profit by information regarding div-
idend actions and other similar matters which had been withheld from the 
stockholders.215 
This reaction from securities market professionals is related to, but distinct from, 
modern public choice explanations for insider trading enforcement, a point 
which is addressed more fully in Part III. 
To be sure, many still believed that insider trading was not only the norm, 
but such a natural part of the market that even talking about the propriety of the 
practice was “a purely academic [and] unprofitable search after counsels of per-
fection.”216 No government regulation, one railway journal wrote, could “eradi-
cate from the human breast the deep-rooted desire to speculate and to take ad-
vantage of early knowledge for the purpose.”217 Even Harriman argued that any 
employee who was not “in” on the Pacific deal ought to be discharged for in-
competency.218 And long-term investors, at any rate, should not even care about 
such behavior—the only ones really harmed by the insiders’ actions were short 
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sellers and other stock market gamblers.219 The “widest benevolence,” a financial 
reporter for the New-York Tribune wrote, could not afford to waste sympathy on 
“a keen band of speculators without the least vested interest in the country, with-
out any other aim or purpose than to reap gambling profits by promoting disaster 
in others.”220 
Those objections, however, were in the minority. The uproar over Union 
Pacific made plain that attitudes were changing and that an increasingly large 
part of the public and of Wall Street did indeed care about such practices. They 
were beginning to take a different view about just how natural insider trading 
was and how accepting they should be when it occurred. Rather than seeing in-
sider trading as a just reward for entrepreneurial effort, commentators fit insider 
trading into the traditional critique applied to all stock market transactions. The 
real problem with Union Pacific episode, according to The Nation, was that it 
allowed Harriman and his fellow directors to “get something for nothing, big 
money for no work.”221 
III. INSIDER TRADING AND STOCK MARKET PARTICIPATION 
Modern arguments for prohibiting insider trading most frequently turn on 
the harmful effects that permitting such trading have on investors’ willingness to 
participate in the stock market. Part of the SEC’s mission is to ensure “the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets,”222 and the government invariably ex-
plains that the rules against insider trading are about leveling the playing field223 
and encouraging investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the market-
place.224 After all, as the Supreme Court observed in a closely related context: 
“Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”225 
Nonetheless, the link between insider trading enforcement, investor confi-
dence, and stock market participation remains contested. Manne, for example, 
claimed that the public “has never shown any signs of losing confidence in the 
stock market because of the existence of insider trading,”226 and subsequent 
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scholars have similarly pointed to the absence of any direct empirical evidence 
that the level of insider trading in the market is negatively correlated with stock 
market participation.227 Indirect evidence, however, is certainly suggestive of 
such a link.228 Insider trading enforcement has been shown to lower the cost of 
capital by improving liquidity and reducing bid-ask spreads.229 Comparative 
studies have shown a correlation between robust insider trading enforcement and 
firm valuations or widespread investor participation in equity capital markets.230 
Behavioral economists have similarly shown that lack of trust231 and increased 
exposure to frauds232 lead to lower stock market participation. Historical evi-
dence, which has not played a significant role in the literature to date,233 can 
provide additional insight into the link between insider trading and stock market 
participation by examining the expressed level of investor confidence when in-
vestors believed that insider trading was endemic in public equity markets. 
This Part addresses these issues in two Sections. The first analyzes common 
conceptions of the stock market at the turn of the twentieth century, with partic-
ular emphasis on beliefs about the prevalence of insider trading and the advice 
offered to ordinary investors for how they should respond to that problem. The 
second analyzes evidence on how two market participants, the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) and investment bankers, responded to these concerns. 
  
 
 227.  See LANGEVOORT, supra note 27, at 65; Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 1242–43. 
 228.  For an overview of the literature, see Kim, supra note 21, at 968–70. 
 229.  See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 76 (2002); 
Hans B. Christensen et al., Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, 
and Enforcement, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 2885, 2885 (2016) (noting that market liquidity improves after introduction 
of regulations to limit insider trading and manipulation); David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Information and the 
Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 1553, 1553 (2004) (observing that capital costs increase with the quantity of private 
information); Raymond P.H. Fishe & Michael A. Robe, The Impact of Illegal Insider Trading in Dealer and 
Specialist Markets: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 465 (2004). 
 230.  Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical 
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 272, 281 (2007). The law and 
finance literature links the rise of dispersed share ownership with sufficient legal protections for minority share-
holders. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1127 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., 
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1136 (1997). 
 231.  See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Trusting the Stock Market, 63 J. FIN. 2557, 2559 
(2008). 
 232.  See Mariassunta Giannetti & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Scandals and Household Stock Market Par-
ticipation, 71 J. FIN. 2591, 2613 (2016). 
 233.  For empirical analyses of the prevalence of insider trading during this time period, see Ajeyo Banerjee 
& E. Woodrow Eckard, Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave (1897–
1903), 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1329, 1329 (2001) (finding that during the period from 1897 to 1903, stock price 
increases prior to merger announcements were not significantly larger than modern price increases); Fabio Brag-
gion & Lyndon Moore, How Insiders Traded Before Rules, 55 BUS. HIST. 562, 565 (2013) (examining director 
sales in British firms during the period from 1890 to 1909, and finding that 20% were in the sixty days prior to a 
poor earnings announcement). 
  
980 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
A. Insider Trading and Stock Market Perceptions 
Part II illustrated several examples that highlight the link that commenta-
tors at the turn of the twentieth century made between insider trading, investor 
confidence, and stock market participation.234 To fully appreciate this historical 
evidence, however, we need to understand how ordinary investors thought about 
the market at the turn of the twentieth century. The law and economics approach 
to insider trading is premised on the semi-strong version of the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis (“ECMH”). Insiders in this model are just another mecha-
nism of market efficiency; their trading provides a vehicle for impounding oth-
erwise undisclosed information into stock prices, thereby enhancing price dis-
covery and the market’s allocative efficiency.235 But that is not how most people 
seemed to think about the stock market in 1900. Many Americans, instead, clung 
to an older conception of the market that had prevailed for most of the nineteenth 
century.236 In the popular imagination, securities prices were driven almost ex-
clusively by the manipulative schemes of stock market professionals. For many 
observers, the small investor was clueless while experienced traders “read the 
tape,” seeing in “every little current and eddy” the work of “the man behind the 
curtain who runs things.”237 To one writer, variations in stock prices were 
“myths, bugaboos [and] will o’ the wisps.”238 Tell-all books written by Wall 
Street operators,239 instructional manuals,240 and the financial pages of newspa-
pers and magazines regularly reported stories about corners, pools, bear raids, 
wash sales, and other devices to engineer changes in securities prices. It was the 
insiders behind these schemes who caused “the rise and fall of listed stocks.”241 
The stock market was, in this view, highly inefficient, but in a way that is 
significantly different from modern views of market inefficiency. Behavioral fi-
nance posits that bubbles and other departures from fundamental efficiency are 
the products of herd behavior, investor overconfidence and irrationality, feed-
back mechanisms, and a host of inherent biases and heuristics common to the 
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mass of traders.242 These factors, proponents argue, can cause, at least in the short 
term, prices to vary significantly from underlying values. Stock prices may over-
react to news;243 hard-to-interpret information may be incorporated more slowly 
into securities prices;244 or there may be unexplained market volatility.245 While 
there is a substantial debate about the significance of these anomalies and how 
and whether they should influence stock market regulation,246 the important 
point for present purposes is that their existence is not the product of overt ma-
nipulation by corporate insiders. It is the collective actions of investors that “ul-
timately drive the market.”247 
At the turn of the twentieth century, by contrast, the underlying cause for 
those departures was commonly claimed to be individual agency—the machina-
tions of market operators and corporate insiders. The “great swings in the mar-
ket,” one writer noted in 1910, were not from changes in fundamentals, but were 
“forced by manipulation.”248 No one doubted that crowds could be delusional. 
Six decades earlier, Charles Mackay wrote Extraordinary Popular Delusions 
and the Madness of Crowds, which chronicled the South Sea bubble and other 
well-known speculative manias.249 For Mackay, people went “mad in herds” and 
only recovered their senses slowly.250 To many popular observers in the early 
1900s, the mass of traders was not solely, or even primarily, responsible for gy-
rations in securities prices. Ordinary traders were simply being manipulated by 
the financiers who really controlled the markets.251 Even the soberest of invest-
ment guides treated manipulation by “a few large speculators” as a “common” 
 
 242.  See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 177 (2d ed. 2005); H. Kent Baker & John R. 
Nofsinger, Psychological Biases of Investors, 11 FIN. SERV. REV. 97, 97 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 851, 852 (1992). 
 243.  Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and the 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, 
and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 17 (1994). 
 244.  See Paul A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: An Analysis of 
Sequential and Conditional Information, 40 ABACUS 21, 23 (2004). 
 245.  Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 84–
85 (2003). 
 246.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: 
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 731–33 (2003); Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2003). 
 247.  SHILLER, supra note 242, at xxi. 
 248.  Frederic Norris Goldsmith, The Investor and the Insider, TICKER & INV. DIG., Nov. 1909, at 256; see 
also Thomas Gibson, Influences Affecting Security Prices and Values, 35 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
627, 627 (1910) (“Manipulation is the most common reason for the segregation of prices and values.”); Horace 
White, The Hughes Investigation, 17 J. POL. ECON. 528, 531 (1909) (“Probably there is never a time when some-
body is not seeking to raise or depress prices artificially.”). 
 249. CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 55 (Har-
riman House 2003). 
 250. Id. at viii. 
 251.  See Parr, supra note 156, at 291–305. 
  
982 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
tool for “inducing the public to buy.”252 It was those men (most often J. P. Mor-
gan) whom cartoonists depicted blowing bubbles and inflating stocks to lure the 
unwary.253 
The idea that individual agency lay behind stock price movements domi-
nated popular writing about Wall Street in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. A typical piece consistent with this view was the anonymous Confessions 
of a Stock Speculator.254 The author, a self-described “Wall Street Piker,” as-
sured readers that a “half dozen giants” controlled the stock markets.255 “Their 
market maneuvers,” he wrote, “are always ‘sure things.’ They know what is go-
ing to happen beforehand.”256 Other Wall Street critics made similar claims. B. 
O. Flower, the editor of the muckraking journal Arena, contended that a few men 
had the ability to arrange “a bull or bear market weeks and even months ahead, 
carefully getting the stock they intend to gamble with into the exact condition 
they desire.”257 
Manipulation occurred on even the most prestigious stock exchanges. 
While the NYSE was increasingly trying to market itself as a high-quality ex-
change that was safe for public investors,258 its efforts faced significant skepti-
cism, especially in the wake of the Panic of 1907. Anyone who knew about “the 
inner life of Wall Street,” one journalist noted, knew that “the machinery of the 
NYSE is used daily to serve the selfish purposes of a single man, or rather of a 
group of men, acting as one, possessed of preponderating wealth, and of almost 
unlimited power.”259 When Theodore Roosevelt denounced the “malefactors of 
great wealth,” he charged that his campaign against corporate immorality had 
“caused these men to combine to bring about as much financial stress [in the 
stock market] as possible, in order to discredit the policy of the Government and 
thereby secure a reversal of that policy, so that they may enjoy unmolested the 
fruits of their own evil-doing.”260 Manipulation was a fact of life for most market 
observers.261 
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The perception that inside information—about companies or about these 
planned manipulations—was essential for investment success was fueled by the 
severe information asymmetry that existed at the turn of the twentieth century,262 
a consequence of both the emergence of national securities markets and the ab-
sence of effective mandatory disclosure regimes.263 Indeed, the shift in percep-
tions about the propriety of insider trading and the first changes in the common 
law approach to insider trading coincided with the first broad calls for enhanced 
corporate disclosure.264 
Meaningful public ownership of securities began with railroad financing in 
the mid-nineteenth century and accelerated with the wave of industrial company 
mergers in the 1890s.265 Before the Civil War, the typical manufacturing busi-
ness operated out of just one location, with one or only a handful of owners.266 
Often, they were members of the same family. Most were organized, not as cor-
porations, but as sole proprietorships or partnerships.267 Unlike many modern 
corporations, most owners were typically the entrepreneurial founders of the firm 
and managers of its day-to-day operations.268 Some antebellum corporations, to 
be sure, had hundreds of shareholders,269 but they were often local and quite fre-
quently the firm’s customers. Those connections gave early shareholders (who 
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typically were as concerned with limiting possible monopolistic abuses as in gar-
nering a financial return270) at least some sense of how the firms operated as well 
as often frequent contact with managers.271 
At the turn of the twentieth century, as investment banking firms sought 
new sources of investment for the burgeoning industrial sector, they began to 
change how securities were marketed. While many of the first railroad securities 
were sold primarily to European investors or United States institutions, by the 
close of the nineteenth century, investment banks such as Lee, Higginson and the 
National City Bank were building sales forces, opening branch offices, and cre-
ating advertising campaigns.272 Mirroring the simultaneous growth of mail-order 
businesses like Sears Roebuck, which were developing national marketing and 
distribution networks, these brokerage firms set out to induce middle class inves-
tors across the country to buy corporate stocks and bonds, both in primary and 
secondary transactions.273 
Technological advances made that outreach possible, but also created an 
environment in which significant information asymmetries, and therefore insider 
trading, could flourish. The development over the previous fifty years of the tel-
egraph, ticker tape, and telephone meant that stock prices could be wired any-
where in the country.274 These technological advances improved market effi-
ciency in some ways, primarily by leveling price disparities between 
exchanges.275 Technology meant that traders would no longer need to be near an 
exchange to invest. “Business may be conducted as readily by letter, telegram or 
telephone as by being on the spot,” one firm assured potential clients in 1898.276 
Rapidly declining communications costs made it profitable for stock brokers to 
solicit those distant customers, expanding the capital available for investment. 
By 1909, nearly 50% of the NYSE’s business came from outside New York.277 
Individual investors, however, still faced significant informational disad-
vantages. That same brokerage firm told small scattered shareholders that no 
matter where they were, they could feel “the beat of each pulse of the market,”278 
but the truth was far different. The controlling shareholders, directors, and offic-
ers—who had developed elaborate internal controls to monitor the corporation’s 
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dispersed operations as the scope of those enterprises expanded279—would nat-
urally know far more about the company than the increasingly dispersed outside 
investors. Because the new industrial securities were also extremely volatile, 
managers had ample opportunities to exploit their informational advantages.280 
In the absence of mandatory disclosure laws, corporations tended to vary 
greatly in the information they provided stockholders. Before 1900, corporations 
provided almost no information to their shareholders.281 Elbert Gary surprised 
the U.S. Steel directors in 1901 when he proposed to publicly release the com-
pany’s financial results.282 Henry O. Havermeyer, the Chairman of American 
Sugar, represented the more common approach, which denied that the corpora-
tion needed to disclose any financial information, even when it sold securities in 
public offerings.283 His philosophy was rooted in caveat emptor and social Dar-
winism. “Let the buyer beware; that covers the whole business,” he told the U.S. 
Industrial Commission in 1899.284 “You can not wet-nurse people from the time 
they are born until the time they die. They have got to wade in and get stuck, and 
that is the way men are educated and cultivated.”285 
To be sure, the NYSE began during this time period to require some basic 
disclosures for companies seeking to list there, and some corporations, like U.S. 
Steel, sought to signal their quality to investors by voluntarily disclosing infor-
mation.286 But the NYSE was alone among the major stock exchanges in requir-
ing disclosures, and even it was inconsistent in enforcing those obligations,287 
particularly in the period from 1885 to 1910. In many cases, disclosure require-
ments were ad hoc, applying to only some (usually smaller) companies that 
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sought an NYSE listing.288 Facing increased competition from other securities 
markets, particularly with respect to the new industrial companies, the NYSE 
began to allow “unlisted” securities to trade on the exchange.289 Although ac-
tively traded, companies in the “Unlisted Department” were not required to re-
port any financial information to the exchange.290 Even some listed companies 
felt free to ignore the Exchange’s requests for information.291 
While corporations slowly began to release more information over the 
course of this time period, the paucity of information available to the ordinary 
investor at the dawn of the twentieth century led the newly created federal Bureau 
of Corporations to conclude in 1904 that “secrecy” in corporate promotion and 
administration were among the “principal evils” in “present industrial condi-
tions.”292 A leading corporate lawyer, James B. Dill, argued that it was the lack 
of reliable information (and not manipulation) that was responsible for the wild 
swings in securities prices that were often observed on the exchanges.293 Con-
cerns about the propriety of insider trading arose simultaneously within concerns 
about information asymmetry in public corporations. 
In a market thought to be dominated by manipulative schemes and in which 
companies inconsistently disclosed information, many investors appeared to be-
lieve that the only sure way to profit was from inside information, either about 
the company itself or about any market operations that were about to be 
launched. Indeed, novice investors’ quest to obtain valuable inside information 
gave rise to a perennial scam. Firms, dubbed “Information Bureaus,” promised 
for a small monthly fee to alert subscribers whenever the “Kings of Finance” 
planned to manipulate a particular stock.294 One such advertisement explained 
why its “Infallible Inside Information” was so crucial for successful investing: 
You are no doubt aware that it is the large operators who reap the profits 
in speculation while the outsiders, or small traders, are the “lambs” who 
are shorn. Our idea is to furnish a service that will put the small investor 
on an equal footing with the large trader, or, to use the parlance of the 
“Street,” the “insider,” and we unhesitatingly say that if our advice is fol-
lowed fortunes can be made by those who have never seen Wall Street, 
equal to that of the largest operator on the floor of the Exchanges.295 
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The Information Bureaus preyed on their customers’ beliefs that advance 
knowledge “is invaluable to anyone who speculates or contemplates entering the 
markets.”296 
These advertisements, which were prevalent throughout the period, helped 
perpetuate the idea that corporate executives were regularly trading on inside 
information. One advertisement entitled “Why?” began: “President [Alexander] 
Cassatt, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, when asked how it is that officers of that 
road, while receiving but moderate salaries, have become such wealthy men, re-
plied, ‘They have great opportunities.’ Inside information is the only road to 
wealth from speculation.”297 Small investors should “[g]et your information 
[about] what the insiders are up to now, and do likewise.”298 As noted previously, 
questions about the propriety of insider trading had already begun to be debated, 
but the view that insider trading was immoral and should be prohibited remained 
the minority position. None of these advertisements suggested that either the in-
siders or anyone purchasing this information was acting wrongfully, a conclusion 
underscored by the placement of these advertisements in prominent newspa-
pers—including the New York Times and Washington Post.299 
The information bureaus highlight a recurring theme in discussions of in-
sider trading during this period. Inside information did have an unsavory conno-
tation, but it was not so much because trading on inside information was consid-
ered immoral; rather it was primarily because so many people peddled false 
inside information. Phony “market tips” continually churned through the street 
“influencing the unwary to further the market operations of the man who sets 
them afloat.”300 Only the “veriest lambs” placed any credence in that kind of 
information.301 Knowledgeable financial writers regularly excoriated the purvey-
ors of these frauds and warned investors to steer well clear of them.302 In his book 
Fifty Years in Wall Street, prominent stock broker Henry Clews offered similar 
advice.303 Young traders should avoid the “slippery ‘tips’ of the professional 
‘pointers’ of the Stock Exchange” and steer clear of the “specious frauds, who 
 
 296.  HILL, supra note 294, at 142; see Inside Information, TICKER, Mar. 1908, at 22. 
 297.  WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1900, at 14. 
 298.  Id.; see also DAVID A. KEISTER, KEISTER’S WALL STREET BUSINESS MANUAL: A HANDBOOK FOR 
EVERYBODY 135 (1900) (“The Sunday papers are filled with glittering opportunities, and many are lead to act 
upon the flashing advertisements which usually read as follows: ‘Get our Inside Information and Make 
Money.’ . . . Avoid all such advice and get-rich-quick schemes, or you and your money will part.”). 
 299.  See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1900, at 24 (displaying an advertisement for the Kendrick Promotion 
Co., which claimed to “HAVE INSIDE INFORMATION with regard to several good gold and copper stocks”); 
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 1901, at 14 (“I have now inside information on an active industry which will have a move 
of 50 POINTS within a very short time. I know the price where to buy and will give this information to an 
operator who will deal in 300 shares, allowing me one-third of the net profits.”); WASH. POST, May 21, 1905, at 
E4 (illustrating an advertisement offering “INSIDE information” that would lead to “GOOD PROFITS”). 
 300.  Anonymous, Confessions of a Stock Speculator, supra note 254, at 670. 
 301.  See A Prominent Financier, Both Sides of Wall Street: Part I. A Thoroughfare for Trade, 10 READER 
451, 461 (1907). 
 302.  See HILL, supra note 294, at 141–42; see also WILLIAM YOUNG STAFFORD, SAFE METHODS OF STOCK 
SPECULATION 67 (1902) (explaining that men controlling the markets “guard their plans with great tenacity, 
confiding in none except those trusted few of the inner circle”). 
 303. CLEWS, supra note 202, at 10. 
  
988 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
pretend to be deep in the councils of the big operators and of all the new ‘pools’ 
in process of formation.”304 “Early information and a big bank roll,” went one 
Wall Street proverb, “will ‘break’ the best man that ever came to Wall Street.”305 
These schemes, nonetheless, apparently engendered at least some level of 
success. “The average speculator,” an anonymous stock broker wrote, “knows 
that ‘tips’ and ‘rumors’ are for the most part a delusion and a snare—but he is 
ever inclined to believe that the ‘tip’ he has just heard is a ‘real one’ and safe to 
follow.”306 In reality, another writer explained, it was only the broker and the 
insider who ever made money in the market.307 Even those who perhaps should 
have known better were not immune to the promise of inside tips. One writer 
claimed that he had seen letters from “National Bank officials (on the bank’s 
stationery), lawyers, merchants, [and] railroad officials” signing up for inside 
information alerts.308 The perils of the market led one cartoonist to depict inside 
information as the foul breath of a witch (“Dame Rumor”), which poisoned 
hordes of small investors.309 
Actual inside information was far different. As the “Wall Street Piker” ex-
plained, true inside information was only available to the “market giants,” and 
they used it, in combination with affirmative misrepresentations or material 
omissions, for personal profit.310 The small investor could not win, because he 
was “putting his insignificant capital and blank ignorance against billions of 
money and certain knowledge. He is guessing where they are certain sure.”311 
The author’s advice was that ordinary investors could not compete with the in-
formational advantages insiders possessed. Since they were bound to lose when 
buying stocks, small investors should stay out of the market entirely.312 
The view that insiders had a substantial trading advantage was not just the 
view of disgruntled traders and confidence men, but of sophisticated market ob-
servers. One market primer defined “insiders” as those “in a position to possess 
information which the public does not have.”313 Financial journalist Sereno 
Stansbury Pratt, commenting on the tendency for prices to decline on good news, 
explained how the market was always discounting the future. “The insider, or the 
far-sighted outsider,” he wrote, “has foreseen the favorable development and 
bought in advance of the news.”314 For Pratt, the “director of a great corporation 
whose securities are listed on the Stock Exchange is an influential individual, 
with sources of information and opportunities of manipulation denied to others. 
He [rather than stock market operators and floor traders] is the true ‘insider’ of 
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the stock-market.”315 A banker from Cleveland, writing to Leslie’s Weekly, ex-
pressed a similar view, reporting that the “change in ownership of the Louisville 
and Nashville shows how impossible it is for an outsider to always know what is 
going on and the great disadvantage he is under compared with the insider who 
does know.”316 
Most writers seemed to treat this kind of trading as a truism of financial 
life, although as shown previously that acceptance was beginning to change. 
Commenting on the future of one railroad, a writer noted that the “situation jus-
tifies a moderate, not an immoderate rise, and you can trust the insider to make 
the most of the situation in the shortest amount of time.”317 An anonymous 
“Prominent Financier” noted in 1907 that if someone had “inside information” 
indicating a stock would decline in value, then he was “equally privileged to ‘go 
short’ of the market.”318 Alexander Dana Noyes, a reporter at the New York 
Evening Post and one of the most influential financial journalists of his genera-
tion, wrote that in the bull market of 1901, everyday conversations were filled 
with tales of successful transactions made possible by the tips that “acquaint-
ances on the inside had privately communicated.”319 Newspapers regaled their 
readers with stories of “bootblacks, barbers, and hotel waiters who had got rich 
by following such pointers from an accommodating Wall Street.”320 While many 
of these stories were no doubt apocryphal, what is significant about them is that 
the behavior they described—the kind of tipping that modern law prohibits—
was viewed as a natural feature of securities markets.321 
It should certainly come as no surprise that the norms of turn-of-the-century 
professional traders permitted insider trading. In the biographies and autobiog-
raphies of these individuals, trading on material, nonpublic information is a re-
curring theme. Consider, for example, Bernard M. Baruch, who began his trading 
career in the 1890s and successfully used inside information on many occa-
sions.322 Baruch’s experiences suggest that inside information was treated as a 
commodity that could legitimately be parceled out to friends or colleagues.323 
Early in his career, Baruch bought stock in the American Spirits Manufacturing 
Company based on a tip that the well-known promoter Thomas Fortune Ryan 
was buying the stock.324 Baruch had worked with Ryan on other market opera-
tions, but he never thought to ask Ryan whether the tip was accurate.325 When 
Baruch lost money, he told Ryan the story. Ryan tried to set Baruch straight on 
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the difference between manipulative tips and inside information.326 “Did I tell 
you to buy that whiskey stock?” Ryan asked the young trader.327 When Baruch 
conceded that he had not, Ryan explained: “Never pay any attention to what I 
am reported to have said to anybody else. A lot of people who ask me questions 
have no right to answers. But you have the right.”328 Baruch apparently deserved 
access to accurate inside information because of his previous work with Ryan 
and because of the friendship that had developed between them. Despite the 
growing concerns about insider trading, among some market participants inside 
information remained a commodity that could be bartered freely among business 
associates or friends, precisely the kind of market that Manne believed existed in 
the United States through the middle of the 1960s. It was, for Manne, “neither 
crass nor undemocratic” for individuals to associate with those with whom they 
could engage in relatively equal exchanges of valuable inside information.329 
What is perhaps more surprising than the quid pro quo among market pro-
fessionals at the turn of the century was that, despite the emerging critical view 
of insider trading, a substantial number of ordinary traders seemed to accept that 
they would inevitably trade at a severe informational disadvantage. The “Wall 
Street Piker” did not blame insiders for abusing their positions for personal 
profit; he expressed grudging admiration of their actions. The insiders were 
simply “smart and shrewd,” and thus presumably entitled to reap the rewards that 
flowed from this kind of market behavior.330 Indeed, he seemed unwilling to con-
demn outright manipulation and not just nondisclosure of material inside infor-
mation. The true fault lay with the public. They were the “fools” who continually 
let themselves be “deluded and hoodwinked.”331 Indeed, Wall Street depended, 
according to another account, on keeping “the public . . . misled and on the 
wrong side of the market.”332 The public “must be made to continually pour into 
this great hopper, the glittering gold, to feed the greedy mill of Wall Street spec-
ulation, that it may grind out colossal fortunes for a few rich insiders.”333 
For many observers, it seemed, the insiders were not to blame, because the 
conventional rules of morality did not apply in the purely competitive stock mar-
ket, despite the common law rules prohibiting manipulation. “Whoever buys” on 
the stock exchange, New York stockbroker John Hume observed, “is understood 
to take all risks, no matter how much deception is used. He may be utterly vic-
timized—often is so—but he has no redress.”334 Another writer expressed a sim-
ilar view about criminal prosecutions of the information bureaus. Rather than 
asking the district attorney to “interfere with these wreckers of fortune,” he 
thought that “those who subscribe for such stuff and who entrust their money 
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into such hands, should be given a through direct ticket to Bloomingdale Asy-
lum.” The foolish investors were at fault for recklessly venturing into the market, 
where “certain ruin” awaited them.335 
There was, in short, widespread mistrust of the stock market at the turn of 
the twentieth century, which likely played a significant role in the unwillingness 
of investors to participate in it.336 While it is difficult to obtain reliable data, it is 
clear that stock market participation remained quite low. Stock ownership and 
trading were clearly expanding; trading volumes on the NYSE tripled between 
1897 and 1901.337 Corporations reported substantial increases in share owner-
ship.338 In 1902, corporations with thousands of shareholders were not uncom-
mon, and four—American Sugar, U.S. Steel, and the Pennsylvania and Union 
Pacific railroads—had between 10,000 and 50,000.339 By 1913 the Pennsylvania 
railroad had almost 90,000 shareholders of record; for U.S. Steel, it was over 
120,000.340 Still, the actual number of individual securities holders remained 
small, with some estimates suggesting that at the turn of the century, less than 
1% of the population owned stocks or bonds.341 Small shareholders remained 
more rhetorical trope than reality, but public discourse increasingly (as discussed 
below) focused on their needs. 
It is difficult to disentangle how much market distrust was attributable to 
fear of manipulation (which the common law prohibited) versus fear of insider 
trading (which the common law did not). Indeed, in some accounts the two were 
inextricably intertwined.342 Nonetheless, it remains clear that both factors were 
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at the heart of warnings to investors to avoid the stock market. Small investors 
were told that they had no chance to compete with the market professionals who 
were rigging stock prices or with the company officials trading on inside infor-
mation. Many books and articles written in the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury were attempts to explain why ordinary individuals should not invest in the 
stock market.343 “What chance have you,” one commentator observed in 1909, 
“against men who command the machinery of manipulation, have all the infor-
mation first, and a great deal of the time control the news that makes prices go 
up and down?”344 The small investor had “as much chance to win out as he would 
have in a card game in which the other fellow sees his hand.”345 Novice investors, 
another dictionary of Wall Street terminology observed, were “lambs” who were 
“always fleeced.”346 Even more experienced operators were bound eventually to 
suffer “serious or ruinous losses [that would] force them out of the ‘Street.’”347 
Framing can influence the decision to invest in stocks348 and Wall Street 
was framed not as a place for sound and safe investments, but as a crooked game 
of chance. Cartoons from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fre-
quently used gambling imagery to represent how stock trading worked,349 which 
likely deterred investors from participating,350 given the disapprobation normally 
attached to gambling. To emphasize their power and innumerable advantages, 
stock manipulators were often depicted as giants who towered over small inves-
tors.351 Wall Street was “iniquitous and immoral” because its denizens “system-
atically played with loaded dice.”352 Bolstering these media accounts were gov-
ernmental reports, such as the 1909 Hughes Committee Report on Speculation 
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in Securities and Commodities353 and the Money Trust investigation of 1912–
1913.354 The Hughes Committee characterized the small-scale investor, who 
lacked “the means and experience” for “intelligent” investing as being in the 
“same class with gambling upon the race-track or at the roulette table.”355 Each 
was “wasteful and morally destructive” and each involved “a practical certainty 
of loss to those who engage in it.”356 There was little sympathy for those who 
lost money; gamblers who were foolish enough not to realize that the game was 
rigged against them got what they deserved.357 
Naturally, we cannot accept at face value these descriptions of the stock 
market. What popular commentators said about the market and how the market 
actually operated were not necessarily the same. What we can say is that stock 
market rhetoric was intended to discourage middle class savers from making eq-
uity investments. Social norms viewed the stock market as a place of ruin.358 
Confirmation and availability biases likely contributed to existing predisposi-
tions to avoid the stock market since the rhetoric of rampant insider trading was 
consistent with the preconceived notions most people had about Wall Street. In 
the face of high perceived risks, stock market participation would naturally be 
lower.359 With so much focus in the popular press on manipulation and insider 
trading, ordinary investors could have easily overestimated the actual likelihood 
that they would fall victim to these practices.360 Many potential investors did not 
have a deep knowledge of the stock market, and modern studies show that indi-
viduals with low information are generally more likely to believe that the market 
is an immoral, tilted playing field.361 And because the markets were so volatile, 
it is not very surprising that outside observers would find patterns that, in their 
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minds, confirmed that insiders dominated price movements on Wall Street.362 
The fact that the law seemed to tolerate insider trading in the absence of manip-
ulation would tend to confirm for knowledgeable potential investors the foolish-
ness of playing the markets. 
B. The Institutional Response to Insider Trading 
In the years from World War I through the 1929 crash, stock market par-
ticipation steadily increased.363 The broad retailing of government bonds to fund 
the war, the federal policy of promoting broad securities ownership, corporate 
and Wall Street efforts to promote stock ownership, and the Jazz Age infatuation 
with the stock market spurred a cultural shift that saw the citizen-investor as an 
integral feature of modern American life.364 Some estimates suggest that by 
1929, roughly a quarter of United States households owned stock in publicly 
traded corporations, compared to approximately 1% at the turn of the twentieth 
century.365 As historian Julia Ott has recently recounted, the change in public 
attitudes toward the market and the increase in stock market participation were 
driven, at least in part, by a concerted publicity effort on the part of the NYSE, 
working with corporations and leading financial firms, to encourage broader 
stock ownership.366 As discussed below, the NYSE’s efforts were part of a 
broader campaign aimed at creating a shareholder democracy that was thought 
to provide at least some antidote to the antitrust and labor problems that were at 
the forefront of public debate. Addressing the fear that investors would invaria-
bly lose out to better informed insiders was part of that effort. 
Henry Manne claimed that any concerns about the propriety of insider trad-
ing—particularly the concerns raised in the Money Trust investigation—must 
have been insignificant because they did not lead to regulatory changes.367 That 
conclusion is open to debate because he does not consider that the stock ex-
changes were the only stock market regulators during the early twentieth cen-
tury.368 Manne is certainly correct that the federal and state proposals to regulate 
the stock exchanges never passed,369 but focusing solely on those efforts is far 
too narrow given the significant uncertainty during this time period over whether 
the government could regulate securities trading at all. The United States Su-
preme Court did not uphold the constitutionality of state blue-sky laws until 
1917,370 and for the next two decades, significant questions remained about 
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whether the federal government possessed the power to regulate stock ex-
changes, a point that the report from the Money Trust investigations took pains 
to emphasize.371 
Instead, stock exchanges, in particular the NYSE, were exclusively self-
regulatory organizations that promulgated listing standards for the securities ad-
mitted for trading.372 There is a substantial academic debate over the rigor of 
these standards and how scrupulously the NYSE actually enforced them in the 
face of its significant competition with other exchanges.373 That debate is not 
directly relevant here, although it is fair to say that the NYSE rejected some se-
curities for listing and at least promoted itself as the market for high quality se-
curities suitable for public investors.374 The important point is that any search for 
changes in insider trading regulation must include NYSE rules as well.375 Indeed, 
the report of the Money Trust investigation that Manne rejected as not leading to 
significant regulatory changes specifically called for changes in stock exchange 
listing standards as the means for addressing the “scandalous practices of officers 
and directors in speculating upon inside and advance information . . . .”376 
The NYSE first adopted listing standards in the 1850s and began to more 
consistently tighten them in about 1910.377 As early as 1875, however, the NYSE 
had raised concerns about the propriety of officers and directors of listed com-
panies engaging in insider trading. In a letter to listed companies, a special com-
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mittee (in what proved to be a futile quest to convince listed companies to pub-
licly disclose more substantial information) criticized the practice and blamed it 
for the “disrepute” of corporations.378 
We presume no one will be bold enough to claim that a favored few are 
entitled to [corporate information] to the prejudice of the many, but the fact 
remains that the few officers and their friends do it while many stockhold-
ers must be content to wait and receive it at such times and in such manner 
as it may be doled out to them. This unjustifiable action has done more than 
anything else to bring railroads, especially, into disrepute. “Speculating Di-
rectors” have become so odious that we feel that honest officers owe it to 
themselves as well as to the public to correct this evil state of affairs, and 
we appeal to you in the earnest and confident hope that you will give us the 
aid of your influence.379 
By 1877, the committee’s “earnest and confident hope” had faded, and it gave 
up on efforts to wring more information from companies. But it also believed 
those efforts were no longer essential. Stockholders were demanding greater in-
formation, and the committee observed: “Apparently the Golden Age of the spec-
ulative director has passed away.”380 
That prediction was, as we have seen, premature; the NYSE’s efforts at 
moral suasion were ineffective. But public attitudes and the political climate had 
changed substantially by the early twentieth century, and an insider trading epi-
sode eventually precipitated at least one change involving the disclosure obliga-
tions applicable to listed companies. In late 1913, critics alleged that the directors 
of B.F. Goodrich had delayed announcing a declared dividend on preferred 
shares.381 When the stock price of the preferred dropped significantly before the 
public announcement, accusations abounded that the directors had deferred dis-
closure in order to trade.382 While there is some uncertainty about whether those 
allegations were true, the criticism nonetheless provides additional support for 
the view that attitudes about the acceptability of insider trading had begun to 
shift. As the Wall Street Journal (focusing equally on morality, reputational 
harm, and property rights) editorialized: 
But it is necessary to state once more, in the most emphatic terms, that 
“inside” information is not a perquisite of directors, but a property of the 
stockholders. . . . A director is a trustee for the stockholder. He has no pre-
ferred rights; and he has grave legal and moral responsibilities. The inci-
dent should be a lesson to the directors of the Goodrich Company to avoid 
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even the appearance of evil. In this instance their ignorance and indiffer-
ence has cast an entirely undeserved slur upon the Stock Exchange, and 
upon the financial center of the country; and inflicted injury not only upon 
the stockholders, but upon corporation management generally.383 
The B.F. Goodrich incident led the NYSE to amend its rules in 1914 to 
prohibit listed companies from delaying disclosure of specified material nonpub-
lic information.384 It is no coincidence that less than a year earlier, in an attempt 
to stave off external regulation, the NYSE had begun its public relations cam-
paign to extol the values of a “free and open market.”385 The response to the B.F. 
Goodrich incident was almost certainly an attempt to show that the NYSE could 
engage in meaningful self-regulation. It was also an attempt to bolster stock trad-
ing, which was 70% lower than it had been at its peak in 1906.386 By 1913, the 
last full year of trading before the NYSE’s extended close during World War 
I,387 volumes had declined to late 1890s levels, even though the number of stock 
issues had increased over 50%. Those declines naturally reduced member in-
comes and the value of exchange seats.388 
To head off regulation and to increase trading volumes, the NYSE’s presi-
dent, William C. Van Antwerp, sought to portray the exchange as a safe venue 
for average Americans to make prudent investments. The “small investor,” Van 
Antwerp wrote, “must be protected and safeguarded in every possible way” by 
assuring them “beyond peradventure that they are dealing with reputable men 
who uphold a fine standard of honor.”389 The “real Wall Street,” he claimed, had 
nothing to do with the dubious promoters and bucket shops to which it was often 
linked.390 The NYSE was not “the Wall Street of Mother Goose and Baron Mun-
chausen.”391 Borrowing Theodore Roosevelt’s phrase, he assured the public that 
the NYSE was “controlled by rigid rules of business morality as to insure to 
everyone who does business there, great and small, rich and poor, an absolutely 
square deal.”392 Addressing the risk of insider trading directly, Van Antwerp 
claimed that each “buyer and seller has an equal and a fair opportunity to profit 
by” the “earliest news” affecting listed companies.393 
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The exchange tightened its listing standards to underscore that point. The 
NYSE now required listed corporations to “publish promptly . . . any action in 
respect to dividends on shares” as well as other specified information that might 
affect market prices.394 That standard was not universal. It did not cover previ-
ously listed issuers and the obligation typically only appeared in the agreements 
negotiated with industrial companies.395 Utilities and railroads were, in the words 
of one writer, “particularly slow to sign agreements.”396 In short, this change in 
listing standards was a weak response to public concerns about the prevalence of 
insider trading. Nonetheless, these agreements were a first, halting step toward 
addressing concerns about insider trading and a demonstration that the relevant 
regulatory authorities were altering their rules in the early twentieth century in 
response to those concerns. 
The rationales offered for this change in listing standards represent a vari-
ation on the modern public choice model of insider trading enforcement, which 
is premised on the idea that securities market professionals seek to eliminate 
managers’ ability to profit from inside information because they will then be the 
group best able to exploit that information.397 This change in listing standards 
was a direct response to public concerns about the ability of corporate managers 
to profit from insider trading, and there is no doubt that requiring prompt release 
of material information would benefit the specialists and proprietary traders who 
were in position to learn of and act quickly on that information. Requiring prompt 
disclosure would help protect NYSE members from systematically losing out to 
better informed insiders.398 The NYSE’s position, however, was grounded on 
something more than giving its members preferential access to such information. 
Exchange members could also benefit from rules that limit insider trading to the 
extent that such rules increased investor confidence in the fairness of secondary 
markets. Sending that kind of signal could expand stock market participation and 
thereby increase trading volumes and commission revenue. 
If building public confidence in the market were, at least partially, the ex-
planation for limiting insider trading at public companies, then one would expect 
to see investment bankers who were engaged predominantly in primary transac-
tions advocating for insider trading restrictions. Underwriters might certainly be 
able to undertake beneficial trading transactions if they had early access to ma-
terial nonpublic information, but their overwhelming concern should be broad-
ening the market of securities purchasers, which would make it easier to sell the 
 
put her “in upon the ground floor” of various pools. OTT, supra note 336, at 191–92. The suit was ultimately 
settled. Mme. Alda Settles Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1921, at 16. 
 394.  New Rule on Dividends: Stock Exchange Adopts It to Prevent Delay in Reports on Them, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 1914, at 12. One member of the NYSE Board of Governors had previously complained that the exchange 
was unable to protect investors in these kinds of situations because there were no “laws that could be applied to 
a company for violating” the exchange’s listing standards. Goodrich Dividend Declaration, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 
5, 1913, at 1. The only remedy was to delist the securities, which was impractical because of the substantial harm 
it would impose on shareholders. Goodrich and Good Morals, supra note 383, at 1. 
 395. SHULTZ, supra note 377, at 19. 
 396.  Id. 
 397.  See Haddock & Macey, supra note 8, at 317–19. 
 398.  Cox, supra note 12, at 630. 
  
No. 3] LOST HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING 999 
securities they underwrote.399 As Vincent Carosso noted in his history of invest-
ment banking: 
The reputation and influence of the leading investment firms, such as J.P. 
Morgan, Kuhn, Loeb, and the First National Bank of New York, rested 
upon their ability to distribute large quantities of securities by selling them 
to their branches or correspondents abroad and to private and commercial 
banks, brokerage houses, and trust and life insurance companies in the 
United States; such firms then resold the stocks or bonds to the public or 
held them as investments.400 
Crucial to this distribution network was cultivating a view among the ultimate 
securities purchasers that they were buying stable, legitimate investments, pro-
tected at least to some degree from insiders seeking to maximize their private 
benefits of control.401 Investment bankers backed these issuances with their own 
reputational capital and thus needed to send investors a strong and credible signal 
about the quality of these securities.402 Those dynamics help explain why invest-
ment bankers often played the role of the “protector of the public shareholder” 
by taking board seats on the companies they underwrote or reorganized.403 If the 
belief in rampant insider trading made investors unwilling to purchase these se-
curities (and that was certainly the advice they received at the time), then there 
should be evidence that investment banking firms opposed managers engaging 
in such activity. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that some underwriters expressed precisely 
these concerns. We have seen some evidence of this already with respect to the 
reaction to the Union Pacific scandal. Media reports suggested that unnamed 
“conservative bankers” favored rules to limit managerial insider trading.404 A 
more specific example arose from the same scandal. Harriman’s primary invest-
ment banker, Otto Kahn, argued that directors and executives had to send a strong 
signal of their trustworthiness to investors.405 Framing an approach that coheres 
closely to Professor Kim’s view of insider trading as a form of private corrup-
tion,406 Kahn asserted that business leaders were no longer free to act without 
constraint, because they occupied a conspicuous place in society.407 Although 
most business leaders failed to realize it, for Kahn, the power they wielded in 
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society made them “legitimate objects for public scrutiny.”408 Their actions were 
now judged under a new, more exacting standard that bore a strong resemblance 
to those holding public office: 
Tennyson wrote of the “fierce light that beats upon a throne,” and the public 
insist very properly and justly upon the same fierce light beating upon those 
in dominant places of finance and commerce. The temptation to the arbi-
trary and selfish exercise of great power is so strong that the burden of 
proof that they can be safely trusted with its possession is nowadays rightly 
laid upon those in high positions. It is for them to show cause why they 
should be considered fit persons to enjoy the people’s confidence, not 
merely for their ability, but just as much, if not more for their character, 
self-restraint, fair mindedness and sense of duty towards the public.409 
Kahn was not arguing for limitations on managerial trading in order to en-
hance his own trading profits.410 Instead, Kahn seemed to be focused on his 
firm’s ability to sell securities in primary transactions. Implicit in Kahn’s criti-
cism of the director’s actions is a belief that the securities of publicly traded 
companies could be sold more easily and at better prices by expanding the depth 
and breadth of the secondary market. Doing that meant convincing investors that 
they would not invariably lose out to better informed insiders. 
Kahn’s insistence that business leaders change their practices was about 
self-preservation. “The undisturbed possession of the material rewards now 
given to success can only be perpetuated if its beneficiaries exercise moderation, 
self-restraint and consideration for others in the use of their opportunities” and if 
they conducted “business as to do their full duty by their employees as well as 
by the public.”411 If they wanted to maintain their privileged position, business 
leaders had to realize that appearances mattered. “A man, and especially a man 
at the head of a great corporation, must not only do right, but he must be very 
careful to avoid even appearances tending to arouse the suspicion of his not doing 
right.”412 He left unsaid that tamping down on insider trading among officers and 
directors would also accrue to his and other underwriters’ benefit. But his state-
ment sent a strong message about what was considered appropriate behavior 
among the leading investment bankers. It was no longer acceptable—at least not 
universally so—for managers of publicly traded companies to take advantage of 
material nonpublic information for personal profit.413 
Of course, one statement by one investment banker is by no means defini-
tive. Additional historical research is necessary to evaluate how other investment 
bankers approached the issue. In particular, it would be helpful to evaluate the 
investment banking firms, like National City, whose primary clientele were mid-
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dle class investors. If bankers from those firms took strong positions against in-
sider trading during this period, that would provide substantial evidence that 
norms were changing and that those changes were driven, at least in part, by a 
desire to expand the market for stocks. What we can say at this point is that the 
notion that stock market participants uniformly found insider trading acceptable 
is simply not true. 
Economists and judges at the turn of the twentieth century also recognized 
the link between broad stock ownership and perceptions of market fairness. They 
argued that encouraging the former required improving the latter.414 One of the 
most prominent was economist Jeremiah W. Jenks. An academic adviser to the 
United States Industrial Commission tasked with recommending legislation to 
address the “trust problem,”415 Jenks argued that the profits from insider trading 
transactions were “tainted” because the director had won them “at the expense 
of stock-holders for whom he is a trustee.”416 Although Jenks recognized the 
important function that stock exchanges played in a modern economy, he thought 
that the profit earned in these transactions was unjustified because the corporate 
officials were not rendering a socially valuable service. In contrast to most mod-
ern views on the harm from insider trading, Jenks argued that the individual on 
the other side of the transaction had in fact suffered a tangible harm.417 “When 
the gain of one person is made at the expense of another without any service to 
society,” Jenks concluded, “and especially when that gain is brought about by 
special knowledge improperly withheld so that the chances in the gambling game 
are not even, the act is dishonorable, and unjust, and detrimental to the public.”418 
Given Jenks’s advisory role, it is hardly surprising that the Industrial Commis-
sion found that insider trading by directors and officers represented one of the 
principal evils of industrial combinations.419 
Jenks’s condemnation of insider trading was part of a larger project to en-
courage broad public stock ownership. Jenks, along with fellow economists 
Richard T. Ely, John Bates Clark, and Judge Peter S. Grosscup, were responding 
to the monopoly, income inequality, and labor unrest problems that dominated 
public debate in the early 1900s and to the increasing concern that the traditional 
American ideal of a proprietary democracy dominated by citizen-owners was 
impossible in a time of industrialization and great concentrations of wealth.420 
The dependency of labor, their separation from any ownership interest in the 
large enterprises in which they worked, Grosscup argued, was “‘the most unre-
publican and menacing fact’ confronting the nation.”421 
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For Jenks and his colleagues, it was futile to try to break up large industrial 
concerns and return to the republican ideal of a nation of small producers and 
yeoman farmers.422 Instead, what was needed was government regulation and a 
reconceptualization of property ownership to include ownership of financial se-
curities.423 By sharing corporate profits more broadly, these men sought to pro-
mote competition for investment funds, maintain the “personal independence” of 
the average citizen, and blur the line between the capitalist and laboring clas-
ses.424 The “old line of demarcation between the capitalist class and the laboring 
class” would start to disappear if a trust was “divided, in its ownership, into a 
myriad of holdings scattered widely among the people.”425 Not only, Grosscup 
argued, would broad-based stock ownership address income inequality by 
spreading “the permanent fruits of progress and prosperity,” but it would create 
“a wide-spread habit of scrutiny” that would transform shareholders into watch-
dogs over corporate excesses.426 Several publicly traded corporations took up 
this call, launching employee stock ownership plans in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.427 
Encouraging this kind of investor democracy, Clark wrote, required making 
stocks “common and safe forms of investment of workmen’s savings.”428 Given 
existing legal rules, many observers concluded that share ownership was simply 
too risky for the average wage earner.429 The “plain people,” Grosscup observed, 
“are distrustful of investing” in securities.430 “No decent, honest citizen,” he be-
lieved, “dare make an investment anywhere in this new property domain that has 
come to the republic.”431 The corporation, Grosscup wrote, had to be “be cleaned 
up, remodeled, if necessary rebuilt on lines of conservatism, fidelity to trust, and 
honesty” in order to encourage “the people at large” to invest in publicly traded 
securities.432 
Echoing the calls of the U.S. Industrial Commission, Jenks, Clark, and Ely 
called for a federal bureau of corporations, improved corporate disclosures, and 
enhanced protections for shareholders.433 The officers, Grosscup wrote, must be 
“trustees of the stockholders, held to the strict accountability to which individual 
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trustees are now held, and denied the privilege, as individual trustees are now 
denied, of making profit out of their trust.”434 Jenks went further, arguing that 
courts should change their approach to insider trading in light of the rise in dis-
persed share ownership and the increased information asymmetries between 
managers and owners.435 This shift made the directors and officers “trustees for 
thousands of stockholders” and warranted changing the “standards of honor” that 
had previously applied to business dealings.436 These proposals were all geared 
toward encouraging stock investment by eliminating the popular perception that 
the market was a rigged game that only the insiders could win. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The goals of this Article have been largely descriptive—to challenge the 
prevailing view that insider trading was a universally accepted practice at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Although insider trading was thought to be wide-
spread, this Article has shown that it was not uniformly regarded as a proper or 
benign practice. Many directors and officers of publicly traded companies cer-
tainly viewed the ability to trade on material nonpublic information as a perqui-
site of their positions and it is not hard to find evidence that, at least in some 
quarters, it was considered a natural, unavoidable feature of stock markets. But 
beginning in the late 1800s and continuing into the early twentieth century, legal 
scholars and practitioners, elite business leaders, economists, financial journal-
ists, and the public all began to question the propriety of allowing corporate man-
agers to use their superior information for trading purposes. These arguments 
were often morality based, but critics and supporters of the common law ap-
proach also raised modern agency cost and property rights arguments as well. 
Among the pubic, views about the prevalence of insider trading were closely 
linked to views about the inefficiency of the securities markets and to advice 
about why ordinary investors should avoid investing there. To encourage broader 
market participation, business leaders and the NYSE began to respond by alter-
ing existing disclosure practices while academic economists advocated limiting 
insider trading in order to make stocks “safe forms of investment of workmen’s 
savings.”437 Those efforts were nascent attempts to signal to investors that they 
would not invariably lose out to better-informed insiders. These finding show 
that concerns about insider trading have existed since the beginning of public 
participation in the stock market and substantially predate the SEC’s decision to 
target insider trading under the federal securities laws. 
This preliminary analysis raises a number of important questions that future 
research can address. Additional research can analyze the extent to which, in the 
absence of legal restrictions, firms adopted private ordering mechanisms to limit 
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insider trading and, if so, the factors that led such firms to do so. A deeper un-
derstanding of this time period, as well as the time period between the progres-
sive era and the early 1960s—when the SEC first addressed insider trading—can 
illuminate the interaction between changing legal rules and changing norms. In 
particular, and given the emerging norms outlined here that condemned insider 
trading at publicly traded companies, future research may be able to explain why 
legal rules took so long to reflect these changing market norms. Understanding 
how the approach to insider trading was changing during this time period and the 
role that the stock exchanges played in this process also contributes to our un-
derstanding of the role that law and market microstructures play in creating the 
foundations for dispersed stock ownership. 
